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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we test the hypothesis that banks provide 
monitoring services that benefit client firm shareholders. We argue 
that if the value of firm-bank relationships stems from monitoring 
services provided by banks, then share price responses associated with 
announcements of bank loans should be cross-sectionally related to 
variables that proxy the degree of monitoring to which firms are already 
subject. Our sample differs from previous studies of bank debt 
, i m  lounc- t-merit s in two key aspects: inclusion of NASDAQ firms, and
inclusion of announcements carried by the newswlre but not the Wal1 
Street Journal. Consistent with suggestions by Fama (1985) and Diamond 
(1985) and theoretical models In the accounting literature, we find that 
firm size is a significant determinant of capital market reactions to 
bank debt announcements— average share price responses are statistically 
positive only for small firms. Moreover, share price responses are 
negatively related to firm size within the small firm sample. We also 
find that initiations of bank debt generate statistically positive 
average share price responses, a result strikingly different from 
previous anomalous findings of statistical significance only for 
renewals of bank debt.
vii
Chapter 1: Introduction
Several recent empirical studies document statistically 
significant positive average prediction errors for firms announcing bank 
credit agreements.1 Assuming semi-strong form market efficiency, these 
results suggest that new information is conveyed by the issuance of bank 
debt. Researchers attempt to empirically identify the nature of this 
information by examining cross-sectional variations in prediction 
errors, James (1987) finds no significant differences among mean 
prediction errors for announcements grouped by purpose, maturity, bond 
rating, or firm size. Lummer and McConnell (1989) find a significant 
difference In mean prediction errors between initiations and renewals of 
bank credit agreements, but no other systematic patterns. Wansley,
Elayan, and Collins (1990) also find that loan Initiation versus renewal 
is important, as well as the percentage of equity held by Insiders and 
Institutions, research and development expense as a percentage of total 
assets, and the relative size of agreement.
In juxtaposition, substantial empirical evidence exists that 
prediction errors around announcements of private or public bond issues 
are negative or statistically zero,2 Studies attempting to explain 
cross-sectional patterns in prediction errors associated with
'Mikkclson and Partch (1986), James (1987), Bailey and Mullineaux 
(1988), Lummer and McConnell (1990), Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), 
and Wansley, Elayan, and Collins (1991).
JSee Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Eckbo (1986), and Smith (1986),
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announcements of straight bond Issues find no significant systematic 
patterns.
Both bank debt Issues and bond Issues are forms of external 
financing for corporations. The asymmetric information problems 
ussoeiated with external financing for corporations have been well 
developed in the literature. Myers (1977) and Myers and MaJluf (1984) 
develop models in which maximization of shareholder wealth may cause 
firm managers to forego profitable Investment opportunities that require 
Issuing external securities. This underinvestment problem Is considered 
an agency cost of external financing that can be reduced if perfect 
contracts can be written and monitored between firms and lenders.
Perfect enforcement of contracts requires observation of agent behavior 
and elimination of information asymmetry. Miller and Rock (1984) 
develop a model in which external financing signals inside Information 
to the capital market about expected future cash flows. In their model 
external financing above that anticipated by the market signals 
nonpos1tive information about a fIrm1s cash flows.
Recent theoretical models of the banking firm focus on the role of 
banks as private Information processors.1 These "asset services" models 
argue that the nature of the intermediation process allows banks to 
perform private Information processing more efficiently than other 
lenders. In this view, banks are well positioned to undertake private 
information processing activities that benefit both bank owners and 
borrowers. Banks’ access to private information and their ability to
’See for example Diamond (1984), Ramakrlshnan and Thakor (1984), Fama 
(1985).
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process this Information efficiently helps to resolve problems created 
by the asymmetry of information In external securities issuance.
Slovln, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) exploit this Idea and argue that 
monitoring activities of banks benefit shareholders of borrowing firms 
issuing seasoned equity. They find that (typically negative) equ ity 
responses to announcements of seasoned equity offerings are attenuated 
by the presence of bank debt in firms' capital structures.
Berlin and Loeys (1988) show theoretically that bondholders with
well diversified portfolios monitor less than a banker. If bondholders 
with limited wealth invested In a firm choose to monitor, they incur the
full costs of monitoring but only a small part of the gains.
Furthermore, Individual monitoring by multiple bondholders is more 
costly and redundant than monitoring by a delegated monitor, possibly a 
bank.
Banks' access to private Information and their ability to 
efficiently process this information allows banks to serve as efficient 
monitors of firm managers. Effective monitoring by banks reduces agency 
costs created by outsiders’ inability to efficiently monitor firm 
manager behavior. Upon announcement of a firm-bank relationship, net 
agency cost savings are capitalized into firm value.
The primary objective of this study Is to test the hypothesis that 
banks provide monitoring services beneficial to shareholders of 
borrowing firms. The basic argument is that if wealth changes 
associated with announcements of bank debt are derived from agency cost 
savings, then announcement effects should be related to the magnitude of 
potential agency cost savings and thus, to the level of monitoring to
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which a borrowing firm is already subject. The level of current
monitoring is measured by proxy variables (monitoring variables)
selected from the agency cost and asymmetric information literatures. 
Evidence comes from an examination of cross-sectional variation in 
prediction errors associated with announcements of issuance of bank 
debt. If monitoring variables explain part of this cross-sectional 
variation (as independent variables in a regression), the monitoring
hypothesis is supported. The evidence provides empirical support for
theoretical models emphasizing the role commercial banks have in 
processing private information and providing monitoring services.
Cross-sectional patterns in prediction errors associated with 
.uinouru'cinfiit s of public bond issues are also examined. Of interest is 
whether the cross-sectional behavior of prediction errors associated 
with bank debt announcements differs from that of straight bond 
announcements. This examination is important for this study because it 
Is argued In the literature that bondholders will not find It beneficial 
to undertake monitoring activities, contrasting with arguments made in 
the banking literature.
Empirical results provide support for the delegated monitoring 
hypothesis and asset services models of the banking firm. The results 
suggest that firms 1ikely to have greater agency problems benefit 
significantly from bank monitoring. Firms assumed to be better 
monitored do not benefit significantly from bank monitoring. Average 
two day prediction errors are positive and statistically significant for 
the full sample of uncontaminated bank debt announcements.
Dichotimizing the sample by firm size reveals, however, that only small
5
firm shareholders experience wealth Increases from bank monitoring.
Large firm shareholders experience normal returns upon announcements of 
bank debt agreements. Moreover, prediction errors are negatively 
related to the natural log of firm size. If the regression sample is 
dichotimized into small and large firms, statistical significance of 
this coefficient obtains only for small firms. Prediction errors are 
unrelated to other monitoring variables employed in the analysis.
These results are consistent with arguments by Fama (1985) and 
Diamond (1985) that small firms are more likely to benefit from bank 
asset services because they may lack reputation and have greater 
asymmetric information problems. The results are also consistent with 
the differential information hypothesis which argues that since 
information collectors are less interested in small firms, small firm 
share prices are less precise than larger firms.
The sample of uncontaminated bond announcements has an 
insignificant average two day prediction error. This result is 
consistent with existing bond announcement studies. Furthermore, 
disaggregating the sample by firm size does not change the results 
appreciably. Bond announcements are cross-sectionally unrelated to 
variables that explain the cross-sectional behavior of bank debt 
announcements. Thus, consistent with theoretical arguments, borrowing 
via straight bonds in the public capital market does not generate 
monitoring related wealth increases for firm shareholders.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review 
of important works In the literature that are relevant for this study. 
Theory and hypotheses are presented In Chapter 3. Data and methodology
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are described in Chapter h. Presented in Chapter 5 are event study 
results for bank debt announcements, followed in Chapter 6 by regression 
results. Chapter 7 contains a discussion of empirical results for bond 
announcements. A summary and conclusions are offered in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
There are four bodies of literature that are most important for 
this study. The first comprises studies aimed at explaining the 
asymmetric information problems associated with corporate securities 
Issuance. The second comprises studies that attempt to explain the 
existence, uniqueness, and nature of financial intermediaries. The 
third comprises studies of the monitoring activities of agents with 
access to private information about firms but who are not part of inside 
management, These agents as a group are called external monitors. The 
fourth is literature focusing on the differential information sets 
available for large and small firms. Sections I, 2, 3, and h of this 
Chapter contain a review of important contributions in each of these 
bodies, respectively.
This study draws together these bodies of literature by arguing 
that bank debt is a different type of security issue than bond debt 
because different types (public or private) of information collected by 
the ultimate securityholders in each type of issue. Theoretical models 
explaining the effects of security Issuance focus on the asymmetry of 
information in the securities Issuance process and the ensuing problems. 
The focus is on security issues in public capital markets where 
asymmetric information problems are potentially significant.
Asset services models of the banking firm argue that banks 
function as private information collectors and processors. These models 
argue that bank financing avoids or attenuates the asymmetric
7
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information problems of the type developed in the securities issuance 
literature. Asymmetric information problems are avoided because private 
information that cannot be revealed to public security markets can be 
revealed to banks, or more generally participants in private markets, 
who agree to confidentiality. Banks specialize in processing this type 
of information that, when combined with the short term nature of bank 
debt, allows them to serve as efficient monitors of firm management so 
that their actions signal favorable private information.
A. Securities Issuance Literature
A.I. Theoretical studies
A bank line of credit or loan is in essence a firm security issue. 
Recent work in the securities Issuance literature focuses on problems 
associated with issuing corporate securities to outside investors who do 
nut have access Lo the same information set as firm managers. This work 
is important because this thesis argues that differences between bank 
debt and bond debt stem primarily from differences in the types of 
information collected.
For bank debt, the securityholder, the bank, has access to private 
information about firms that other capital market participants typically 
do not. Outside investors may infer from the actions of banks whether 
unobservable information is favorable or unfavorable, making bank debt a 
unique type of security issue. The securities issuance literature 
concerning primarily equity and bond Issues helps establish the 
foundation for the view that bank debt is a security that avoids 
problems created by other types of external securities.
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Leiand and Pyle (1977) consider asymmetric information problems 
associated with the Initial issuance of public shares of a firm. An 
entrepreneur has an incentive to sell shares in his firm for as much as 
possible, even at a price above their value. Outside potential 
investors do not have access to the same information as the entrepreneur 
and thus, are less certain of the true value of the shares. Without a 
means of transferring the private information to outside investors or a 
credible signal that the unobserved information is favorable, a form of 
the familiar Akerloff lemons problem results. Leland and Pyle argue 
that the proportion of shares retained by an entrepreneur in an initial 
public offering is a credible signal of true firm quality and helps to 
mitigate asymmetric information problems.
Myers (1977) analyzes determinants of corporate borrowing by 
viewing part of firm value as the present value of its future investment 
options (i.e. assets not in place). He shows that if firms issue risky 
debt, then there can be states when it is shareholder-wealth maximizing 
for managers to forego positive net present value investment 
opportunities. Ex ante this reduces firm value. This underinvestment 
problem, he argues, is an agency cost of debt. The problem can be 
avoided if debt matures before the investment option expires or if 
perfect clauses can be written in debt contracts. All other solutions 
to under-investment problems involve agency costs. Solutions in which 
firms still use debt are likely to Involve nontrivial monitoring or 
bonding costs which shareholders agree to bear when the increase in firm 
value more than offsets these costs.
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Myers and MaJluf (1984) extend the work of Myers into a framework 
predicting which types of securities firm managers prefer to issue and 
In which order. They assume that firm managers have Information that 
Investors do not and that managers act in the Interest of passive 
existing shareholders.4 Existing shareholders benefit if managers can 
sell overvalued securities to other investors, creating a situation in 
which investors infer from a manager's decision to issue securities that 
the securities are overvalued. Thus, with the exception of risk-free 
debt, any security Issuance is met with a negative market reaction and 
the reaction is more negative the riskier the security. The decision 
noL to issue securities is good news but may cause an underinvestment 
problem in that managers forego profitable Investment opportunities that 
cannot be funded internally. If external financing is necessary, they 
show that firm managers should raise capital according to a "pecking 
order," using Internal capital first, then risk-free debt, rlaky debt, 
quasi-equity, and finally equity.
Miller and Rock (1985) develop a model in which managers’ 
decisions about dividend declarations signal Information about firms' 
unobservable cash flows. Higher than anticipated dividends signal 
higher than expected cash flows and vice versa. Similarly, managers' 
decisions about external financing also signal Information about 
unobservable cash flows. Higher than anticipated external financing 
signals lower than expected cash flows and vice versa.
4Passlve existing shareholders do not adjust their portfolios In 
response to managers' actions.
11
In summary, work In the securities issuance literature focuses on 
asymmetric information problems in the external securities process that 
may reduce firm value. Firm value may be reduced since the capital 
market may interpret securities issues as reflecting either an attempt 
to Issue overvalued securities or lower than expected future cash flow,
A.2. Empirical studies of bond announcements
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) examine equity responses to 
announcements of security offerings and find significantly positive 
abnormal returns for announcements of bank loans and nonpos itive returns 
for public and private debt issues. They also find that prediction 
errors surrounding security Issuance announcements are cross-sectionally 
related to the type of security offered and the stated reason for the 
offering and unrelated to the new financing dollar amount, offering 
size, and quality rating of debt.
Eckbo (1986) examines equity responses to corporate debt offerings 
and finds that straight debt offerings generally induce nonpositive (but 
not significant) prediction errors while convertible debt offerings 
induce significantly negative prediction errors. He finds that offering 
size, bond rating, tax shields, or abnormal changes in firm earnings 
cannot explain patterns in prediction errors.
James (1987) finds that average equity responses to straight 
public debt offerings are nonpositive and insignificant, while average 
equity responses to private debt placements are negative at the .10 
leve1.
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The significance of the above three studies is the implication 
that external debt issues do not generate wealth increases for issuing 
firm shareholders which differs from empirical results for bank debt 
announcements discussed later showing that shareholders of firms that 
issue bank debt experience, on average, significant wealth increases.
The implication of the different reactions is that bank debt provides 
shareholders of borrowing firms with an increase in wealth on average, 
while other types of debt produce no significantly positive wealth 
effects. This suggests that it is therefore reasonable to hypothesize 
that banks provide a special service benefitting client firm 
shareholders.
B. Existence, Nature, and Uniqueness of Financial Intermediaries
B.l. Theoretical studies
Given the cLassic perfect market assumptions of costless 
transactions and costless and equal access to information, there does 
not readily appear to be an economic need for commercial banks, or more 
generally, financial intermediaries. Relaxation of one or both of these 
assumptions allows satisfactory explanations of the existence of the 
banking firm. In regard to the assumption of equal and costless access 
to information, recent advances in the theory of the banking firm focus 
on the role of banks in collecting and processing private information 
about their cllent firms. Leiand and Pyle (1977) argue that banks have 
a comparative advantage in information collection because there are 
economies of scale in information gathering. Bank shareholders benefit
13
from collection of private Information through reduction of credit risk 
In banks' loan portfolios.
Campbell (1979) argues that firm managers are Information 
specialists who have private Information about available Investment 
projects. Current firm shareholders do not receive full monopoly rents 
from projects if securities are sold publicly with full Information 
disclosure because rents must be distributed across all security 
holders. Issuing a security to a party who agrees to keep private 
Information confidential and not invest in any other securities of a 
firm allows monopoly rents to accrue to current shareholders. To 
fulfill this role, a party must specialize in processing private 
information. Also, monitoring to ensure the party does not invest in 
other securities must be efficient. Issuing a differentiated security 
(debt) with a higher priority claim partially resolves the problem, and 
limiting this party to hold only these differentiated securities reduces 
the need for monitoring by equityholders. The necessary constraints on 
a party closely resemble the constraints on financial Institutions in 
the United States.
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that financial intermediaries may 
eliminate or reduce informational asymmetries. Their work concerns how 
entrepreneurs can signal firm quality when they wish to sell shares via 
an initial public offering. The asymmetry of information between firm 
insiders and outsiders, and the incentive problems associated with 
selling the firm to less well informed investors are attenuated by the 
use of a credible signal. Leland and Pyle posit that a credible signal 
of firm quality is the amount of equity an entrepreneur retains in an
14
Initial public offering. Retaining a relatively larger share of equity 
causes an entrepreneur’s portfolio to be less well diversified. 
Entrepreneurs of low quality firms find it too costly to concentrate 
their portfolio holdings in their firms. Entrepreneurs of high quality 
firms have concentrated portfolio holdings in higher quality firms so 
signalling is less costly.
Of more importance here is Leland and Pyle’s suggestion that 
financial intermediaries exist because they reduce asymmetric 
information problems. They argue that financial intermediaries are more 
efficient at information production because of economies of scale in 
information gathering. They note that interpretation of costly 
information gathered by an agent presents two problems: (1) uncertain
credibility of the information, and (2) the public good aspect of 
information collected if any signal is emitted. They argue that 
financial intermediation solves both problems: intermediaries have an
incentive to ensure that high quality information is collected for 
reduction of portfolio risk, and higher returns earned on their asset 
portfolios cover information costs.
Campbell and Kracaw (1980) develop a more rigorous model of 
financial intermediation and information production. Their model 
differs significantly from the financial intermediation aspects of 
Leland and Pyle. First, they show that it is necessary to certify 
information quality by investing in firms about which intermediaries 
generate information. By risking their own equity, financial 
intermediaries reduce moral hazard problems of inadequate monitoring.
lb
Another major difference between Campbell and Kracaw and Leland 
and Pyle is the assumption of the privity of information collected. 
Leland and Pyle assume that no investor can be privy to another 
investor’s Information. In contrast, Campbell and Kracaw assume that 
all information Is revealed during the tatonnement process of market 
clearing. For outside shareholders to benefit from bank monitoring, 
they must be able to observe that the bank has collected and processed 
private firm information, but not the private information itself.
Diamond (1984) develops a model of financial intermediation in 
which Intermediaries act as delegated monitors. This avoids problems of 
duplicate information gathering and free rider problems associated with 
information collection. Capital provision/acquisition through an 
intermediary is more efficient for both lenders (depositors) and 
borrowers since information gathering costs are minimized. Diamond’s 
model considers the ex post information asymmetry where ex post refers 
to after the financing Is obtained. Diamond does show, however, that 
Leland and Pyle’s model which considers ex ante information asymmetries 
yields similar results when analyzed in the context of his model.
All three of the above works share the common theme that financial 
Intermediaries exist because they specialize in private information 
collection and processing. While banks play a monitoring role in each 
of these models, the role is limited to monitoring on behalf of bank 
depositors and/or shareholders. The role banks play in serving as 
monitors benefitting other outside claimholders of the client firm is 
not explicitly considered. This work is important background for this 
study because if banks are to serve as efficient monitors of firms, then
16
they must collect and process private information about their client 
firms. Since financial intermediary equity is at risk, and since a 
return is earned on costly information collected, outsiders who have an 
interest in a borrowing firm can free-ride on monitoring activities by 
financial intermediaries and be assured that signals they receive are 
credible.
Two more recent theoretical works emphasizing the information 
processing role of commercial banks are also interesting. Pennacchi 
(1988) develops a model to analyze loan sales by financial institutions 
and the resulting optimal contracts. He assumes that banks can engage 
in information acquisition and monitoring to increase their portfolio 
returns. He notes that assets fall into two categories--those that 
require monitoring and those that do not. Banks serve merely as 
underwriters of loans for firms requiring no monitoring. This seemingly 
unimportant point has significant Implications for the interpretation of 
changes in shareholder wealth if these changes reflect agency cost 
savings. Well monitored firms fall into the underwriting group and are 
not expected to experience agency cost savings from new bank debt or the 
resulting significant positive returns.
Berlin and Loeys (1988) model the choice and optimal contracts 
that a firm makes between bond financing with strict covenants and no 
monitoring, and bank financing with monitoring but more lenient or 
possibly no covenants. In their model, a bank's only role is that of 
"monitoring specialist." They show theoretically that well-diversified 
bondholders will monitor too little so that a bank that monitors the
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firm may be necessary. They then discuss optimal contracts and 
compensation schemes to ensure reliable bank monitoring.
B.2. Empirical studies
The uniqueness of commercial banks is not eminently Important for 
this study. Results from uniqueness studies, however, suggest that 
relationships with commercial banks are valued In the capital market.
The results are Important background whether commercial banks are unique 
or not. This section traces the evolution of recent work in this area.
Fama (1980) originally attributed the uniqueness of commercial 
banks to government regulations. Moreover, he argued that commercial 
bank regulation was unnecessary as long as the financial services 
industry remained competitive. Five years later, Fama (1985) presented 
evidence that banks must provide a unique service to borrowers because 
the incidence of the reserve "tax" on certificates of deposit (CDs) 
falls upon borrowers. Comparison of rates on CDs with rates on similar 
alternative investments indicates that lenders (depositors) do not bear 
the tax. Moreover, the tax would not be borne by bank shareholders 
since they have available alternative investments not subject to the 
tax.
Fama (1985) also stresses the role of banks in signalling 
information. He argues that since banks have relatively low priority 
claims, granting a bank loan signals higher priority (nonequity) 
clalroholders that they need not undertake redundant and costly 
monitoring. Though Fama does not mention (lower priority)
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equityholders, they may also benefit from bank monitoring.5 Slovin, 
Sushka. and Hudson (1988 and 1990) argue and find evidence that 
borrowing firm shareholders benefit from monitoring activities of banks 
through a reduction in agency costs,
James (1987) provides an extension of Kama's analysis as well as 
further evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans,6 By looking at 
changes in reserve requirements and subsequent changes in CD rates,
James supports Kama's conclusion that borrowers bear the reserve tax. 
Additionally, James uses event study methodology to analyze client firm 
share responses to announcements of bank loans. He suggests that since 
bank debt is a form of inside debt, using it avoids underinvestment 
problems of the type developed in Myers and Majluf (198A). James's 
results indicate a significantly positive average abnormal return for 
firms announcing bank loans.
To demonstrate that bank debt is unique, he also examines equity 
responses to announcements of public and private debt issues. He finds
responses to announcements of public debt issues are not significantly
different from zero while responses to private debt issues are 
significantly negative. James could not attribute cross-sectional
variation in announcement effects to any one of the following: purpose
5Reports in recent bankruptcy literature indicate that priority rules 
are frequently violated in Chapter 11 bankruptcy with unsecured creditors 
and equity holders sharing in residual firm value. Thus, the actual 
priority of claimholders of firms in financial distress may be higher or 
lower than indicated by absolute priority rules.
6See Bailey and Mullineaux (1990) later in this discuss!on for evidence 
contrary to James' suggestion that positive average prediction errors 
indicate uniqueness of bank debt.
I
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of debt issue, maturity of issue, size of issue, risk of borrower, end 
size of the borrower.
A striking finding of James* study is that announcements of both 
private and straight debt issues to refinance bank loans induce 
statistically significant negative average prediction errors. 
Additionally, he finds no significant difference between prediction 
errors for bank loans that refinance debt and bank loans for new capital 
expenditures.
In a similar study, although with a different motivation, Slovin, 
Sushka, and Hudson (1988) find that firms announcing commercial paper 
issues backed by irrevocable bank letters of credit experience 
significant positive average abnormal returns; announcements of 
commercial paper issues not backed by banks generate normal returns. 
Differences in bond ratings do not explain their findings.
Lummer and McConnell (1989) also examine equity responses to 
announcements of bank loan agreements. They too find a positive average 
abnormal return for their entire sample. Their contribution is to 
dichotimize the sample into new loan agreements and renewed or revised 
loan agreements. Average abnormal returns for the renewal group are 
significantly positive; average abnormal returns for the new group are 
not statistically significant. Further partitioning of the two groups 
shows that firms that had prior negative public announcements concerning 
bank debt experience the largest abnormal returns. Lummer and McConnell 
agree with Fama (1985) in their interpretation suggesting that the loan 
renewal and review process provides valuable signals to the capital 
market.
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The main contribution of Lummer and McConnell, that of 
dichotimizlng the sample into new agreements and renewals, yields 
suspect results however. It Is reasonable to expect the Wall Street 
Journal to announce more loan renewals previously thought to be doubtful 
renewals, than to announce renewals the capital market expected to be 
renewed. LM argue that firms and banks may be hesitant about reporting 
negative news about bank financings.7 This may create a selection bias, 
which LM note, that makes their results less useful.
The seriousness of this problem is reflected In their apparently 
paradoxical results. If only renewals or revisions to bank loans or 
lines generate significant information about borrowing firms, why do 
rational investors, who expect future renewals and revisions, not 
capitalize this value upon announcement of new bank loans?
Bailey and Mulllneaux (1989) are successful In demonstrating that 
James’s results do not provide unambiguous evidence about the uniqueness 
of commercial banks. They examine equity responses to announcements by 
firms securing bank-type debt from nonbank financial Intermediaries. 
Results indicate that the capital market responds favorably to 
announcements of this type of capital acquisition too; average abnormal 
returns are positive and significant. They conclude that the inside 
nature of bank-type debt is important, not bank debt per se. They also 
dichotimize the sample into new and renewed agreements with a criterion
’The plausibility of this must be considered in light of SEC charges 
against Charter Company firm managers In 1986 regarding the nondisclosure 
to shareholders of important information about bank debt negotiations.
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similar to Lummer and McConnell and find no significant difference in 
average prediction errors between the groups.
Even though average abnormal returns surrounding bank loan 
announcements in each of these studies are positive, there are firms 
within each sample that have either insignificant or negative abnormal 
returns. In fact, proportion tests in each of the studies show that a 
significant portion of the abnormal returns are nonpositive. With the 
exception of Lummer and McConnell's examination of unfavorable revision 
announcements, no studies attempt an explanation of this. As noted, no 
variables have been found to consistently explain cross-sectional 
variation in prediction errors for announcements of bank debt,
C . External Monitoring
There are five major groups of external agents researchers have 
identified as potentially efficient monitors of firms. Auditors, 
investment bankers, large outside blockholders, security analysts, and 
banks have all been hypothesized to fulfill monitoring roles.
Easterbrook (1984) and Razeff (1982), in attempting to explain the 
payment of dividends, suggest that paying dividends forces firms to 
enter capital markets periodically subjecting managers to review and 
monitoring, thereby reducing agency costs. Easterbrook suggests that 
Investment bankers and other financial intermediaries may be the most 
efficient and credible monitors since they risk equity and reputational 
capital when certifying an issue. Easterbrook also notes that continual 
refinancing of debt or any other undertaking that forces firms to return 
to capital markets could serve the same purpose.
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An additional Interesting Insight by Easterbrook helps provide 
rationale for the empirics of this study. He argues that since 
monitoring is costly, ",..we would expect to see substitution among 
agency cost control devices" (1984, p.657). The empirical tests 
conducted In this study use this insight. By assuming substltutab ility 
among agency-cost control devices and diminishing returns to monitoring, 
we argue that the value of any one control device depends directly upon 
the amount, extent, and costs of other control devices already in place.
We next discuss important representative works in the external 
monitoring 1iterature.
C .1. Auditors
Titman and Trueman (1986) develop a theoretical model wherein 
Investors infer the value of a new issue by observing the quality of 
auditor chosen by an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs of high quality firms 
choose high quality auditors, who presumably are better at uncovering 
negative information. Since auditors detect and reveal negative 
information about a going-public firm, entrepreneurs with negative 
information find it too expensive to retain a high quality auditor, i.e. 
to mimic an entrepreneur with positive information. Titman and Trueman 
argue that their model might also be applicable to the choice of 
investment banker or any other outsider who generates information about 
firms.
C.2. Investment bankers
Beatty and Ritter (1986) develop and support empirically a model 
in which investment bankers risk reputational capital when certifying
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the accuracy ui an initial public offering price. Accurate is defined 
as consistent with their developed underpricing equilibrium. Since 
entrepreneurs have incentive to choose offer prices above true market 
value, they can hire investment bankers to certify true value. An 
investment banker who, on average, prices out of the underpricing 
equilibrium loses business and thus, the return on its reputational 
capltal.
C.3. Blockholders
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model in which a large 
shareholder monitors firm management and initiates a takeover if firm 
vaKu* can be- increased Monitoring costs incurred by the large 
shareholder are covered by the return earned on his shares. Brickley, 
Lease, and Smith (1988) find empirical evidence that large shareholders 
vote more actively on issues that affect shareholder wealth. Agrawal 
and Mandelker (1990) find a positive relationship between share price 
responses to anti-takeover amendments and institutional ownership.
C.U. Security analysts
In their seminal paper on agency theory, Jensen and Heckling 
(1976) suggest that security analysts’ social value is generated from 
their monitoring activities which reduce agency costs, Moyer,
Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989) demonstrate empirically that the demand 
for security analysts (measured by the number of earnings forecasts 
generated for a firm) is significantly related to a number of variables 
proxying the need for monitoring.
1U
C .5, Banks
Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) examine the effect of external 
monitoring on prediction errors associated with announcements of 
seasoned common stock issues. They find that the presence of bank debt 
and the use of prestigious investment banking firms have positive 
effects on the (negative) prediction errors associated with seasoned 
common stock issues.
D. Firm size
The hypothesized importance of firm size for bank debt 
announcements stems from arguments developed in the finance and 
accounting literatures regarding differential amounts of information 
collected for smal1 versus large firms. Several Important works from 
these literatures are discussed below.
Diamond (1985) and Fama (1985) in the finance literature emphasize 
the problems small firms face in external security issuance because of 
the lack of information available about small firms. The lack of 
information makes contracting costs for small firms relatively more 
expensive in public capital markets, Diamond argues that reputation, 
which small firms may lack, is important In public debt markets. Since 
banks are given access to and efficiently process private information, 
small firms find it beneficial to choose bank financing over public 
capital markets. Information collection by banks reduces information 
problems for small firms, which in turn, mitigates adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems associated with external financing. For large
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firms with less severe information asymmetries or substantial 
reputation, problems are less serious.
Thus, small firms benefit most from bank monitoring services.
Fama (1985) argues that the low priority of bank debt, combined with its 
relatively short maturity and inside nature position banks to credibly 
signal creditworthiness to other small firm claimholders. This avoids 
costly duplication of information gathering, thereby benefitting small 
I i i ni c la imho 1 de rs ,
Arbel and Strebel (1982) find a neglected firm effect separate 
from the well documented small firm effect. They detect the neglected 
firm effect by analyzing the number of security analysts following firms 
and note that security analysts spend more time collecting information 
about large firms. Also in the finance literature, Bajaj and Vijh 
(1990) find stronger price reactions and yield effects for dividend 
changes of low price stocks and small capitalization firms.
In the accounting literature, Atiase (1980) develops a model of 
differential information for small versus large firms. He argues that 
information collectors are less interested in small firms. Lower total 
equity values of small firms restrict potential rewards to information 
collection because positions taken by informed traders are necessarily 
smaller for smaller firms. Lower total equity values and fewer traders 
increase the 1 ikelihood of detection of informed trading, also reducing 
potential rewards to information collected. This results in lower 
precision of small firm share prices and thus, greater price adjustments 
when information is revealed. Atiase (1985), Freeman (1987), and
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Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987) find supporting evidence when 
examining reactions to earnings forecasts and announcements.
The firm size literature collectively predicts that less 
information is generated about small firms resulting in greater 
information asymmetries. Greater information asymmetries lead to 
greater moral hazard and adverse selection problems, both of which may 
be attenuated by efficient monitoring. Asset services models argue that 
banks are well positioned to provide monitoring services for small 
firms.
Chapter 3: Hypotheses
A . Theory and Background
Two major agency cut>U affecting shareholder wealth have been 
identified in the literature. One is identified by Jensen and Heckling 
(1976) who develop a model of agency costs that includes monitoring and 
bonding costs and residual losses associated with agency problems. A 
second is identified by Myers (1977) who examines the determinants of 
corporate borrowing. In Myer’s model issuing risky debt creates the 
potential for suboptimal future investment strategies involving managers 
choosing to forego valuable investment opportunities (more detail in 
Literature Review) He argues that this suboptimal investment strategy 
is an agency cost of debt borne by firm shareholders. In principle, 
both agency costs can be reduced by effective monitoring. The 
ii'lat ionsliip between agency cost savings and the hypotheses tests is 
developed below.
The underlying logic of the tests of the overall hypothesis and 
the series of individual hypotheses can be developed most 
straightforwardly in Jensen and Heckling’s model since it Incorporates 
monitoring. This logic is developed next followed by arguments for the 
same logic under the Myers model.
A.I. Jensen and Meckling
Jensen and Meckling consider a firm owned by insiders and 
outsiders. They assume that insiders have opportunity and incentive to
27
28
consume nonpecuniary items. With a positive proportion of outside 
ownership, insiders pay less than the full costs of any nonpecuniary 
items they consume. Thus, their incentive to consume nonpecuniary items 
is an increasing function of outside ownership. Costs of nonpecuniary 
consumption by insiders to the firm, net of any benefits generated, roust 
be deducted when determining firm value. Moreover, if insiders are 
monitored or undertake bonding activities, monitoring and bonding costs 
must also be deducted. Optimally, monitors will be employed up to the 
point where marginal costs of monitoring equal marginal benefits of 
agency cost reductions.
They also identify other sources of agency costs for firms with 
separate ownership and control. Aside from nonpecuniary consumption, 
managers may not put forth effort consistent with maximizing shareholder 
wealth. The loss of value arising from this lack of or misguided effort 
is an agency cost. They also show that managers have opportunity and 
incentive to expropriate wealth from claimholders with fixed claims 
(bondholders). Since bondholders anticipate this, they pay less for 
bonds to reflect expected future expropriations and associated costs of 
monitoring. This also represents an agency cost borne by firm owners.
Assuming that outsiders may undertake a costly monitoring 
activity, firm value is:
V - V ’ - F(M,a) - M (1)
where:
V — firm value.
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V ' firm value if insiders consume no
non-pecuniary items,
F(M,a) - the net cost to the firm of providing
nonpecuniary items to firm insiders
M monitoring costs,
a — proportion of the firm owned by insiders.
We can generalize F(H,a) to include all sources of agency costs for the 
firm and V ’ to be firm value with no agency problems. Jensen and 
Meckling assume the following about F(M,a):
In words, they assume that monitoring decreases agency costs at a 
decreasing rate. They note that rational investors force insiders to 
bear the entire burden of monitoring and agency costs. Therefore, 
insiders have incentive to retain the services of monitors if doing so 
increases insiders’ utility through a reduction in their burden. 
Insiders have this incentive when they do not prefer nonpecuniary 
consumption and/or their behavior is consistent with value maximization 
and wish to signal this fact to the asymmetrically informed capital 
market.
Value maximizing insiders will employ monitors if they generate 
marginal benefits greater or equal to their marginal costs; that is, 
monitors will be employed if 3V/3M Is nonnegative. This can be seen by
3F(M,a)/3M < 0 (2)
32F(M,a)/3M2 > 0 (3)
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maximizing equation (1) with respect to M yielding the first order 
condition:
av/am — ar/aM - 1 - o (4)
or
-dF/3M - 1 (5)
The second order condition for a maximum Is fulfilled by the assumption 
of 3 2F/aM2 > 0. Additional monitors are employed up to the point where 
the marginal cost of monitoring equals the incremental dollar increase 
in firm value. Thus, we know that costly monitors will not be employed 
if doing so decreases firm value.
Now consider the value of a firm at two different levels of 
monitoring, M' and M", where M ’ < H", and with the assumption that 
3V/3M' and 3V/9M" are nonnegative. Given the assumptions of 3F(M,a)/3M 
arid d2 F(M, a)/3M2 , If we examine increases in firm value resulting from 
increases in monitoring, we find that increases in value are greater the 
lesser is the current level of monitoring. Denote the value of the firm 
with M ’ level of monitoring V ’ and the value of the firm with M" level 
of monitoring V". Then, mathematically we have that 3V'/3M > dV"/3M.
The partial derivatives provide us with an intuitively appealing 
result. Given the above model and assumptions, if changes in 
shareholder wealth upon announcement of bank loans result from decreased 
future agency costs, then wealth effects should be negatively related to 
the level of current monitoring. Ceteris paribus, shareholders of firms 
that are already well monitored (M Is relatively high) should experience
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smaller wealth changes because the Increased monitoring is likely to 
yield smaller decreases in future agency costs.1 Ceteris paribus, 
shareholders of firms that are poorly monitored (M is relatively low) 
should have larger wealth changes since the increased monitoring is 
1ikely to result in larger decreases in future agency costs.
For purposes of hypothesis testing, it is also important to note 
that the above relationship holds for the return to shareholders as 
well. This is true since:
a W 3 M  > 5VV3M (6)
v- V"
holds for all dV/dM > 0.
A . 2. Myers
The existence of risky debt creates the potential for suboptimal 
future investment strategies in Myer’s model. Ex ante this reduces firm 
value and shareholder wealth. Monitoring may ensure that an optimal 
investment policy is followed. Resulting monitoring costs reduce 
shareholder wealth but are offset by Increased firm value arising from 
the change to an optimal investment strategy. Although Myers does not 
incorporate an agency cost function like Jensen and Meckling, we might 
also assume that the function in his model would be similar, i.e. 
dF(M,a)/3M < 0, 32F(M,a)/3M2 > 0. This results in predictions
identical to Jensen and Meckling's model.
’Here, I implicitly assume similar F(a,i) across firms
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Following Easterbrook (1984), we assume that there is 
substitutability among different agency cost control (or monitoring) 
devices. Ceteris paribus, firms with high levels of control devices are 
assumed to be well monitored resulting in smaller increases in value 
upon addition of a (possibly new) monitor. Variables are chosen from 
several areas of literature; each area is noted with the discussion of 
the individual hypothesis. The abnormal return (prediction error) 
earned by shareholders upon announcement of the granting of a bank loan 
agreement should be negatively/positively related to a proxy variable 
that measures the current level of monitoring,
B. Individual Hypotheses
Evidence for or against the main hypothesis is provided by 
individual hypotheses tested using statistical procedures.
Additionally, rejection of the hypothesis of identical cross-sectional 
behavior of prediction errors for bond announcements and bank debt 
announcements provides support for the main hypothesis, A number of 
variables are used as proxies for firms' current levels of monitoring. 
Individual hypotheses are summarized below followed by discussions of 
each.
B.l. Summary of Hypotheses
Prediction errors associated with announcements of bank debt are 
hypothesized to be:
1. Negatively related to firm size.
2. Negatively related to percentage of shares owned by insiders.
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3. Negatively related to percentage of shares owned by 
Institutional holders.
i*. Negatively related to number of institutional investors.
5. Positively/Negatively related to the proportion of debt in the 
capital structure.
6. Positively/Negatively related to the proportion of bank debt 
currently in capital structure.
7. Negatively related to a dummy variable equal to one for firms 
with Big-Eight auditors and zero otherwise.
8. Negatively related to a dummy variable equal to one for firms 
that recently paid a dividend.




Consistent with the firm size literature we expect smaller firms
to benefit more from bank debt than larger firms. Fama (1985) argues
that small firms find a cost advantage in using inside (bank) debt 
because of lower contracting costs. Diamond (1985) argues that 
reputation is important in debt markets. Small firms may lack 
reputation which, combined with their greater asymmetric information 
problems, increases the possibility of moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems.
Similar to Fama, Atiase (1980) argues that little information Is 
available about small firms because rewards for information collection
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about these firms are limited for two reasons. First, total values are 
small suggesting a given size (percentage) price correction generates 
smaller profits. Second, low total values and few capital market 
participants increase the likelihood of detection of informed trading. 
Thus, small firm share prices are less precise and adjust by greater 
amounts upon announcement of economically significant news.
These arguments suggest that small firms benefit more from 
additional monitors than larger firms with greater amounts of low cost 
information available. Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship 
between prediction errors and firm size.
2. Insider holdings
The proportion of the firm owned by insiders is considered by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). The higher this proportion, the greater the 
cost borne by insiders of any nonpecuniary consumption. Additionally, 
as insider ownership increases, insiders have greater incentive to 
maximize firm value consistent with shareholders’ goals. These two 
factors lead to reductions in the need for, and value of monitoring.
This argument predicts a negative relationship between insider holdings 
and prediction errors.
Stulz (1988) argues that insider holdings may increase to a level 
that weakens discipline by the corporate control market resulting in 
more severe incentive problems. To adjust for this possible 
nonlinearity and the relative wide range of values for insider holdings, 
we use the natural log of Insider holdings in regressions. Therefore,
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the expected relationship between the prediction error and the log of 
the percentage of insider holdings is negative.
3,4. Outside blockholders
A related variable and hypothesis is concerned with the proportion 
of firms owned by large outside blockholders. Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) develop a model in which a large shareholder monitors firm 
managers and Initiates a takeover if firm value can be increased. The 
large shareholder's monitoring costs are covered by the return on his 
shares. Empirical evidence shows that large blockholders are more 
likely to vote and resist actions that may harm shareholders.1 
Monitoring activities of outside blockholders who have claims equal in 
priority to other outside shareholders benefit other outside 
shareholders.’ Thus, a negative relationship is expected between 
prediction errors and percentage of firm owned by institutional holders. 
Additionally, a negative relationship is expected between prediction 
errors and the number of institutional holders.
5,6. Leverage
There are at least two alternative hypotheses about the 
relationship between existing leverage and announcement effects. The 
first hypothesis is a negative relationship resulting from the argument 
that highly levered firms are already well monitored by bond holders and
3Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) and Agrawal and Mandelker (1990).
’Recent bankruptcy literature finds that priority rules are often 
violated in bankruptcy increasing the likelihood that monitoring by higher 
priority claimholders benefits lower priority claimholders.
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do not benefit as much from marginal monitoring. There are two reasons 
debt may reduce the need for monitoring. First, bonds typically contain 
protective and restrictive covenants that limit the activities of 
insiders.'* Second, Jensen (1986) argues that a high proportion of debt 
in capital structure reduces free cash flow since some cash flow must be 
used for debt service. This results in less free cash flow for use at 
managers’ discretion. Both arguments predict that a higher percentage 
of debt in firms' capital structures lessens the discretion of insiders, 
and subsequently reduces the value of additional monitoring. Thi s leads 
to an expected negative relationship between prediction errors and the 
proportion of debt in capital structure.
The second hypothesis, a positive relationship between leverage 
and announcement effects, derives from the argument that firms with 
higher leverage may have lower debt service capacity and thus will be 
monitored more intensely by marginal lenders. Similarly, firms with 
lower leverage may have higher debt service capacity and thus require 
less monitoring by marginal lenders. Ceteris paribus, the predicted 
different levels of monitoring could generate different levels of 
prediction errors.
The same two alternative hypotheses for leverage apply to the 
relative amounts of existing bank debt. There Is empirical evidence 
that suggests banks monitor and reduce Informational asymmetries 
associated with certain external financing events.5 Firms with 
relatively larger amounts of bank debt are assumed to be better
4See Smith and Warner (1979) .
’Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1988) and (1990),
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monitored so that addition of more bank debt results in smaller share 
price responses.
7. Auditors
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Titman and Trueman (1986) suggest 
that auditors serve as monitors for firms. Empirical evidence by 
DeAngelo (1981) and Dopuch and Simunlc (1982) lends support to this 
suggestion. Specifically, differences have been found between reactions 
of firms employing Big-Eight accounting firms and firms employing non- 
Big-Elght accounting firms. The basic hypothesis is that Big-Eight 
accounting firms possess higher reputational capital implying that they 
are better monitors than are non-Big-Elght firms. Thus, prediction 
errors are expected to be smaller for firms with Big-Eight auditors.
8. Dividends
Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) argue that dividends provide 
a proxy for how well a firm is currently monitored. Their basic 
argument is that firm managers that choose to pay dividends and 
simultaneously (subsequently) raise external capital might do so as a 
means of reducing agency costs. Opting to pay out cash flow and raise 
capital externally subjects firm insiders to more frequent review and 
monitoring by financial market participants. Thus, firms that paid 
recent dividends are expected to have smaller prediction errors than 
firms that did not.
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9. Differences between share price responses of bonds and bank debt 
Differences in capital market reactions to bond and bank debt 
announcements are hypothesized based upon differing information sets 
available and differing degrees of monitoring. The information sets and 
degree of monitoring associated with bank debt are discussed in 
Chapter 2. Briefly reviewing, recent models of the banking firm focus 
on an asset services view wherein banks specialize in private 
information collection and processing and act as delegated monitors of 
firms Bank lending dominates public financing for firms with 
asymmetric information problems.
In contrast, theoretical arguments generally predict that 
bondholders will not find it cost efficient to monitor firms.4 In 
practice, a trustee, typically a large commercial bank, is appointed who 
has fiduciary responsibilities to bondholders to monitor firms in 
exchange for a relatively small fee. Unlike commercial banks who lend 
money to (buy securities from) firms, trustees do not risk equity 
directly in the course of their duties. Like lending banks, however, 
they do risk reputational capital. Trustees who do not satisfactorily 
perform their duties not only risk legal actions, but also damage to 
reputational capital Thus, bondholders employ monitors similar, in 
principle, to monitors employed with bank borrowing.
A major difference between the type of monitoring arises, however, 
when the different types of information collected by trustees and banks 
are considered. Trustees are charged with ensuring that bond covenants 
are met and initiating certain actions if they are not. Most bond
4See for example, Berlin and Loeys (1988).
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rovenants are "boiler-plate," generally tightly written rules leaving 
little room for Trustee discretion. Furthermore, the Information 
necessary to ensure compliance with bond covenants Is generally non- 
private information.7 For example, typical covenants include making 
payments when scheduled, limiting dividend payments, limiting merger and 
acquisition activity, and specifying default and cross-default 
provisions. Additionally, trustees may rely on compliance letters that 
firm managers are required to supply periodically.
In contrast, bank credit agreements typically contain a number of 
boiler-plate covenants as well as more loosely written rules giving bank 
monitors relatively more discretion. For example, it is quite common 
for credit agreements to have a "material adverse change" clause. Such 
a clause gives bank monitors broad rights upon an event they deem as 
materially adverse. Moreover, bank monitors typically require and are 
given access to private firm information that trustees do not require. 
The combination of this information with provisions for forcing change 
positions banks to serve as effective monitors of firm management.
Thus, cross-sectional behavior of prediction errors associated 
with bond and bank announcements are hypothesized to differ. 
Specifically, bank announcement prediction errors are hypothesized to 
vary systematically with monitoring variables. Bond announcements, in 
contrast, are hypothesized to be unrelated to monitoring variables.
’Smith and Warner (1979) and Berlin and Loeys (1988) emphasize this
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C. A CompetLng Hypothesis
A competing hypothesis about differences between bank debt and 
bond debt is based on differing maturities between the two. Flannery
(1986) argues that managers of firms with positive inside information 
choose to issue shorter term debt since the risk premium on shorter term 
debt is smaller. Later when the positive information is revealed, the 
debt is refinanced at a lower risk premium than possible before. Thus, 
Issuance of short term debt may be interpreted by the market as a 
positive signal about unobservable information causing a positive 
revaluation. Conversely, issuance of longer term debt may be 
interpreted as a negative or neutral signal about the issuing firm. His 
argument does not involve differential amounts of monitoring In the 
short and long term debt markets.
Since bank debt is typically shorter in maturity than public or 
private debt, Flannery’s "maturity hypothesis" has the potential to 
explain differing announcement effects between bank and nonbank debt. 
Therefore, maturity is included as an independent variable. James
(1987) tests this hypothesis and finds no evidence to support it.
Chapter 4: Date and Methodology
This Chapter describes the data and methodology of this study.
First we briefly summarize the steps in this study. Details of the data 
collection process are discussed in Part 1 followed by a discussion of 
the methodology in Part 2.
First, we collect a sample of firms that announce bank debt and a 
sample of firms that announce straight public bond Issues. Both 
NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms are included in the sample. Observations 
with inadequate CRSP return data or with information unrelated to the 
bank financing or bond issue are deleted from the final sample. We then 
collect firm specific "monitoring variables" for each remaining firm. 
Using event time methodology, we calculate market model prediction 
errors or abnormal returns and corresponding significance tests around 
each announcement.
To test hypotheses, we first disaggregate samples according to 
monitoring variable values. Group means tests are performed to test 
null hypotheses of equal group means. We then run weighted least 
squares regressions on each sample (bank and bond debt) independently. 
Prediction errors are dependent variables and monitoring and control 




A.I. Bank Debt Announcements
The sample or firms announcing bank debt Issues is constructed as 
follows. We search the Dow Jones News Retrieval database from January 
1, 1980 to December 31, 1986 for entries Including at least one of the
following terras: credit agreement, line of credit, credit line, credit
facility, and loan agreement. This database includes the full text of 
selected articles from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ.) and the 
"Broadtape," or newswire, as well as other business publications.
Entries not carried by the WSJ and/or not carried only on the newswire 
are filtered out using DJNR search procedures. These might Include 
r t i c 1 e s f r om Bus i nes sweek , Fo r tune , etc.
For 1984, 1985, and 1986, every event remaining after this filter
Is collected and remains In the overall sample. Details of 
announcements carried only on the newswire are taken from the Dow Jones 
News Retrieval database text. Details of WSJ announcements are taken 
from the actual WSJ articles. Even though the majority of these
observations do not remain for the final clean sample, analyzing the
character of these announcements yields insight into the processes by 
which information about bank debt is disseminated. Using the 1984-1986 
sample for this analysis allows equal chance of representation of every 
type of bank debt announcement.
A striking finding from this breakdown is the number of 
announcements carried on the newswire only, i.e. never published in the 
WSJ. The sample of these "wire only" announcements represents 29.6% of 
the total sample for 1984-1986, This is an important finding because
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prior studies of bank debt announcements have samples generated from 
searches of the Wall Street Journal Index. By omitting the newswire 
part of the sample, existing studies may be subject to selection bias 
created by WSJ editors. This proposition is investigated in Chapter 5.
For 1980-1983, DJNS search procedures are used to filter out 
observations that contain contaminating information indicated by the 
presence of at least one of the following terms: net earnings or losses, 
mergers or acquisitions, common stock, debentures, and downgrades. Also 
omitted are entries carried only on the newswire. The reason for the 
second omission is cost; information about these announcements must be
downloaded from the DJNS database.
For inclusion, remaining observations must be cited in the Wall 
Street Journal Index and have an unambiguous announcement date. After 
these filters, 957 announcements remain for 1980-1983. Even though 
these announcements are prescreened for contaminating information, some 
contaminated announcements remain after these filters. These 
announcements are reclassified accordingly after reading the WSJ 
article.
Thus, the full sample for 1980-1986 contains 2763 observations,
2228 from the WSJ and 535 from the newswire. C8SP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ 
files are searched to identify firms with available return data. The
names structure of the CRSP tapes is searched to allow for name changes.
The sample for which prediction errors are available totals 1984 
observations.
hU
A, 2. Bond Issue Announcements
The sample of firms announcing straight publ1c bond issues Is 
constructed as follows. The Registered Offering Statistics (ROS) tape 
is used to generate a list of companies filing straight public bond 
issues between 1977 and 1983. Filings identified on the ROS tape as 
shelf filings and offerings are omitted from the sample because they 
present problems beyond the scope of this study. Since the number of 
shelf offerings Increased dramatically after 1982 when they were 
Instituted, we search backwards to 1977 for observations. Additionally, 
joint filings of straight bonds and convertible bonds, common stock, 
warrants, or preferred stock are omitted.
Since the ROS tape is known to contain erroneous data, the 
following safeguards are followed to ensure data integrity. The Wall 
Street Journal Index is searched for announcements by these firms to 
verify announcement dates. The announcement date is assumed to be the 
WSJ article date, not the filing date indicated on the ROS tape. If the 
WSJ announcement occurs more than 2 days after the filing date on the 
ROS tape, it is not used. This presupposes that the majority of dates 
on the ROS tape are correct and avoids including announcements carried 
by the WSJ, but are already public Information.
A.3. Clean Sample Screening Criteria
Observations from the two samples are omitted from the clean 
samples If they meet any one of the following criteria:
1. Contain information in the announcement unrelated to the 
financing arrangement (e.g. earnings or dividend announcements) or
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have other announcements within a specified window as evidenced by 
citations in the Wall Street Journal Index. For bank debt 
announcements, this window is the announcement date (a newswire 
date) plus two business days. For bond debt announcements, the 
window is the announcement date (a WSJ date) plus and minus one 
business day,
2. Have inadequate (erroneous or missing) returns to estimate 
market model parameters.
3. Sources for monitoring variables cannot be found. Efforts are 
made to locate monitoring variables for firms not listed on 
Compus tat.
Attributes of financing arrangements are collected when reported 
in the Wall Street Journal. These Include type of agreement, collateral 
arrangements, maturity, dollar amount, and purpose. Also, bank credit 
agreements are classified as loan initiations, extens ions, or 
expansions.
A .4. Monitoring Variables
This section describes how each of the monitoring variables is 
measured.
Firm size is measured as the total market value of outstanding 
common equity shares. The number of shares outstanding is multiplied by 
the market price per share on the last day of the estimation period.
The number of shares outstanding is that reported on the CRSP tape for 
the most recent date prior to the last day of the estimation period.
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Firms are classified as small (below CRSP median) or large (above CRSP 
median). The CRSP median value for each year is calculated using mid­
year equity market values of all NYSE/AMEX CRSP firms.
The percentage of insider holdings is collected from Value Line. 
Value Line availability is limited to post-1979 so insider holdings 
could not be collected for 1977-1979 bond announcements. The percentage 
of institutional holdings and the number of institutional holders is 
collected from Standard & Poor’s Security Owner’s Stock Guide.
The proportion of debt in capital structure is measured as book 
value of long-term debt from Compustat divided by market value of common 
equity. Book value of debt for firms not on Compustat is taken from 
Standard & Poor's Security Owner’s Stock Guide if available. Auditor 
name is determined from one of the following sources: Compustat.
Moodv’s Industrial Manuals. Who Audits America, or individual company 
1 OK reports A firm is classified as having paid a dividend if CRSP
indicates that a cash dividend has been paid in the 120 trading days
prior to the event. Existing bank debt Is measured as Compustat "debt
in current liabilities" less "long term debt due in one year."
B. Methodology
B.l. Event Study Methodology
Event time methodology is used in this study for two reasons.
First, the methodology is appropriate for this type of study since the 
changes in market value of firm equity are hypothesized to result from 
the announcements of interest. Second, using this particular event
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study methodology ensures comparability with other studies of bank debt 
announcements.
The methodology can be summarized as follows (equations are listed 
below the text), Parameters of a return generating process (assumed 
here to be the market model) are estimated via an ordinary least squares 
regression (eqn. 1) over an interval usually close in calendar time to, 
but excluding a window around, the announcement date. Parameter 
estimates are then used to predict what a "normal" return would be on 
the days of Interest conditional on corresponding market returns. 
Predicted returns are subtracted from actual returns resulting in 
prediction errors (PEs) (eqn. 2) or abnormal returns. PEs can be 
accumulated over time intervals to estimate the cummulative PEs (CPEs) 
and averaged across firms resulting in average PEs or CPEs (APEs or 
ACPEs) (eqns. 3,4).
Each PE is standardized by its own forecast error producing a 
standardized PE (SPE) (eqn. 5) which accounts for: noise in the time
series returns used to estimate the parameters, bias in the estimates, 
and potential abnormality of corresponding market returns. The same 
magnitude PE can differ in statistical significance for different firms 
because different firms can have different levels of "normal" variation 
or noise in their returns. Noisier firms require larger PEs for 
statistical significance than do firms with smaller variability in their 
return streams. Standardized PEs (SPEs) can then be accumulated over 
various intervals and averaged across firms to conduct significance 
tests.
6 8
The test statistic for the null hypothesis of no abnormal return 
(i.e. HD: mean CPE — 0) for a group of observations is constructed as 
follows. SPEs are accumulated over time intervals of interest to form 
standardized cummulative prediction errors (SCPEs) and then averaged 
across firms resulting in average SCPEs (ASCPEs) (eqn. 6). Since each 
SPE is assumed to be asymptotically distributed as unit normal, ASCPE 
can be multiplied by the square root of the number of observations and 
adjusted for the number of days in the interval to generate an 
asymptotically unit normal test statistic (Z) (eqn. 7) under the null
hypothesis of no abnormal return.
RL - a + bi^ + u, (1)
FElit - Rljt - a, - (2)
APE - (l/N)ZPEjt (3)
J
ACPE - (l/N)EEPEjt (4)
i t
SPElit - PElit/Sl>t (5)
ASCPEd - (1/N)ES SPEl / (d)(1/2) (6)
t i
Z - ASCPE (N)(W2> (7)
where:
PE, t — prediction error for security i on day t,
R, t — return for security i on day t.
a, — market model intercept for security i.
B, — market model coefficient for security i.
t — value weighted CRSP index return for day t.
49
Ŝ, - standard deviation of the forecast
prediction error.
d - number of days in the Interval.
Actual data used in the procedure are as follows. Firm returns 
(R,) used for parameter estimation are CRSP daily returns including 
dividends. The CRSP value weighted index is used as a proxy for the 
market portfolio return (R*).1 The estimation period for the market 
model is from 170 days before the announcement to 21 days before the 
announcement. This is the same estimation period used by Mikkelson and 
Partch and Lummer and McConnell, ensuring that differences between this 
study and previous studies do not result from different estimation 
procedures.
Cumulative prediction errors are calculated for days 0 and +1 and 
used in group comparisons and regressions. This two-day prediction
error Is most frequently used because of its economic significance. The
seemingly unusual window (days zero and plus one) is Justified as 
follows. Most event studies define the announcement date as the date 
the announcement was published by the W£J.. Researchers consider that 
day and the preceding trading day in case the announcement was carried 
on newswire the day before its WSJ date. Since this study defines the 
event date as the newswire date, that date and the next date is used in 
case the announcement was made after trading hours.
“Peterson (1989) notes that empirical evidence suggests that using a 
value-weIghted market index is more conservative. Tests using equal- 
weighted indexes are more likely to detect abnormal performance.
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Announcements carried on the newswire include the time stamp 
Indicating the time of day of the announcement. Since we have the text 
of newswire announcements, event dates for these are more precise. If 
the announcement occurs after the close of trading, we define the event 
date as the next trading day. Additionally, if the time stamp reveals 
that an announcement was corrected some time after the original 
announcement, the lirst time stamp is used to define the event date.
B.2. Comparison of Group Means
Observations are grouped according to qualitative or quantitative 
monitoring variables. Qualitative grouping is straightforward based on 
the discreteness of the variable. Quantitative grouping is based on 
subdivisions by median values. Means tests are conducted as follows. 
Standardized prediction errors are OLS regressed on an intercept term 
and a dummy assuming unity for one group and zero for the other. The 
coefficient on the dummy represents the difference in means between the 
two group. The null hypothesis is that the dummy regression coefficient 
equals aero. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero, 
then the hypothesis of equal group means is rejected. This methodology 
yields results identical to single variable analysis of variance.
B.3. Multivariate Regressions
Weighted least square regressions are performed on each sample.
The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative prediction error for 
days 0 and +1. Independent variables are the monitoring variables as 
defined in the Hypotheses Section. All variables are weighted by the 
respective inverses of the standard forecast errors of prediction errors
f)l
to adjust for hetereoscedastlcity In stock returns. T-statistics are 
used to determine the significance of regression coefficients.
Chapter 5: Event Study Results for Bank Credit Agreement Announcements
Discussion of the empirical results for bank debt announcements 
comprises two main sections— event study and cross-sectional regression 
results. This chapter contains a discussion of event study results; 
Chapter 6 contains a discussion of regression results. This chapter Is 
divided into four parts containing discussions of results for: (A) the
full sample and the sample of initiations and renewals of bank debt, (B)
contaminating events, (C) the source of the announcements, and
(D) the sample of uncontaminated initiations and renewals of bank debt. 
Part D is further divided into two sections, event study results by firm 
attributes and by agreement attributes. Also analyzed are subsamples of 
various contaminating events, subsamples disaggregated by firm size for 
contaminated and uncontaminated announcements, and subsamples of various 
agreement characteristics for contaminated and uncontaminated
announcements. Each of these groupings is further disaggregated by the
source of the announcement: announcements from the WSJ and newswire
combined, and announcements carried by the WSJ. Results providing 
evidence for or against hypotheses are discussed. Each section 
concludes with a summary of key results.
A. Full sample and sample of inic iat ions and renewals
The search described in Chapter U for bank debt announcements 
yielded 2,763 announcements. After omitting observations for which CRSP
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returns either could not be found or are Insufficient in number to 
estimate market model parameters, 1,984 observations remained. This 
sample contains many different types of bank debt announcements 
including initiations and renewals of bank debt as well as other bank 
debt announcements that do not represent bank debt "issuances." With 
the exception of hummer and McConnell (1989) who report results for bank 
debt reductions and cancellations, extant bank debt studies report 
results only for initiations and renewals of bank debt. No researchers 
report event study results for a comprehensive sample of all types of 
bank debt announcements. Thus, these results are presented in Tables 
5-1 and 5-2 and discussed in detail.
The average two day prediction error (APE) for this sample is 
-0.83 % (z—-6.73), statistically significant at the 1% confidence level 
with 46.4% of the prediction errors positive. Of the 1,984 
announcements, 890 observations (44.9% of the sample), represent 
announcements of the initiation or renewal of bank debt. This subsample 
generates a statistically positive APE of 0.58% (z—3.32). Thus, even 
with contaminating information, announcements of bank debt initiations 
and renewals, on average, sustain a positive reaction from the capital 
market.
Since APEs differ in sign and magnitude between the full sample of 
announcements and the sample of initiations and renewals, we investigate 
specific types of bank debt announcements that generate negative 
reactions. The negative average return for the full sample reflects the 
large number of negative announcements about bank debt. For example, 
observations may contain information about net losses, and technical or
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payment defaults. Also reflected in the negative average are some 
relatively large negative returns. For example, some observations 
contain Information concerning bankruptcy filings. Consequently, 
contaminated announcements are categorized with respect to type of 
contaminating information. Disaggregating by type of contamination 
yields Insights Into the processes by which Information about bank debt 
Is made public.
A contaminated announcement may contain severa 1 types of 
Information. For example, an earnings announcement may report a 
technical default due to losses. Thus, contamination in a single 
announcement may fall Into multiple categories.
B. Contaminating events
Bank debt announcements often contain accompanying negative 
information. Announcements containing Information about earnings, 
dividends, or payment and technical defaults generate negative two day 
average prediction errors. Furthermore, the subsample of announcements 
containing contaminating Information that does not fit into one of my 
categories has a negative two day average prediction error. The subset 
of observations In each group Involving an Initiation or renewal of bank 
debt have nonnegative average two day prediction errors. The results 
are consistent with a hypothesis that firm managers attempt to offset 
negative Information by systematically arranging simultaneous 
announcements of bank debt initiations or renewals.
Some contaminated bank debt announcement subsaraples have positive 
average two day prediction errors. These subsamples include default 
waivers, bidder firm merger news, and security repurchases.
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B.l. Reductions, cancellations, and "searches for" for bank credit
Only 18 reductions or cancellations of bank credit agreements are 
reported suggesting that either they occur less frequently than 
initiations and renewals or they are systematically not reported by firm 
managers, banks, and the financial press. Whatever the reason, they 
induce statistically negative market reactions as evidenced by an APE of 
-8.84% (z--4,84, n-18) with only 33.3% of the prediction errors 
positive. Reductions or cancellations of bank credit often result from 
other unfavorable events likely to reduce firm value.
Eleven firms that announce they "intend to complete" a bank credit 
agreement have APE of 2.65% (z—2,06), statistically significant. 
Twenty-seven firms that announce they are "seeking" a bank credit 
agreement have a statistically negative APE of -3.48% (z—-2.86). 
Announcements indicating that firms "seeking" bank credit are typically 
by firms In declining financial health.
B.2. Restructuring announcements
Bank debt restructurings represent about 12%, or 242 observations, 
of the full sample. Restructurings are defined as announcements that 
clearly indicate that firms are restructuring bank debt and 
announcements in which, although not called restructurings, terms of 
bank debt agreements are modified in ways different from a "normal" 
renewal. For example, a bank may extend the maturity of an agreement by 
one month while negotiations for a new agreement are completed. The 
full sample of restructurings generates a statistically significant APE 
of -0.63% (z--4.29) with only 44.6 % of the prediction errors positive.
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Fifty-three announcements Involve simultaneous bank debt restructuring 
and renewal or Initiation of other bank debt. These observations 
generate an APE of 0.94% (z—0.73), not significantly different from zero 
with 50,9% of the prediction errors positive. These results suggest 
that the market regards bank debt restructurings as a nonnegative event 
only if banks agree to renew and/or increase a firm’s borrowing 
capacity. Restructurings of bank debt without a renewal of bank debt 
are typically the result of firms’ Inabilities to meet scheduled 
payments which may signal that firms' cash flows are lower than 
antic ipated.
B.3. Acquisition announcements
Bank debt announcements containing information about pending 
acquisitions or takeover attempts/fights can be dichotlmlzed by whether 
they Involve bidder firm bank debt or target firm bank debt. There are 
120 announcements about bidder firm bank debt; they generate a 
statistically positive APE of 0.97 % (z—3.31). The subsample of 66 
announcements In which bidder firms Initiate or renew bank debt has a 
lower APE of 0.51 % (z — 1.17), not statistically significant.
Target firm bank debt announcements typically involve news about 
target firms obtaining or possessing credit lines to fight unfriendly 
takeover attempts. These 32 announcements generate an APE of -0.71 %
(z—-1.48), not significantly different from zero. The subset of 17 
target firm initiations or renewals of bank debt has an APE of -0.87 %
(z — -1.43), also not statistically significant.
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B .4. Earning announcements
Earnings information contaminates bank debt announcements in two 
ways. First, earnings information may be announced within the text of a 
bank debt announcement In the WSJ. Second, earnings and bank debt 
information may be announced within newswire announcement text with only 
earnings numbers reported in the WSJ "Earnings Digest." No bank debt 
information is found by reading the WSJ index for these events because 
the index contains only the earnings numbers and lists the "Earnings 
Digest" page as the relevant article. Because the text of the latter 
type of announcements must be retrieved from the Dow Jones News Service 
database, this group of announcements is collected only for the years 
1984-1986.
Bank debt announcements with earnings information that do not 
involve initiations or renewals are typically negative. Most 
announcements contain negative earnings and technical or payment 
defaults, restructurings, or some other nonpositive action concerning 
firm bank debt. The full sample of 366 earnings and bank debt
announcements generates a statistically negative APE of -2.18 % (z—
9.19); only 40.2 % of the prediction errors are positive. The subsample 
of 86 initiation and renewal announcements has an APE of -0.61 % (z—  
1.33), not statistically significant with 45.3% of the prediction errors 
posItive.
In 36 announcements it is clear that earnings are reported or are 
forecasted to be below year-ago earnings. They have an insignificant 
APE of -0.18% (z— 0.70) and 41.7% of the returns are positive. Nineteen
announcements in which it is clear that earnings are higher than year-
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ago earnings have an APE of -0.95% (z—-0.97), also not statistically 
significant with 47.4% of the prediction errors positive.
Earnings announcements reported separately from bank debt 
announcements but appearing within the event window contaminate 54 
announcements. The full sample of simultaneous but separate earnings 
and bank debt announcements generates a statistically negative APE of 
-2.89 % (z— 3.57). For announcements in which a firm initiates or 
renews bank debt (n—25) the APE is -0.00% (z-0.71), not statistically 
s ignifleant.
Although we do not control for expected versus unexpected 
components of earnings announcement effects, the above results suggest 
that firm managers may attempt to use bank debt as positive signals to 
offset negative earnings information. Initiations or renewals of bank 
debt announced with earnings information generate statistically 
insignificant APEs while announcements not involving initiations or 
renewals generate statistically significant negative APES. If the 
capital market regards banks as high quality monitors willing to signal 
positive approval of inside information by risking bank reputation and 
capital, even in the face of unexpectedly negative earnings, then 
simultaneous positive announcements of bank debt may mitigate effects of 
negat ive earnings.
B.5. Default announcements
DeiaulL announcements are categorized into the following groups: 
payment defaults, technical defaults, firm actions curing defaults, 
banks waiving defaults, and firms receiving prior approval for an action
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that would otherwise cause default. Over 90%, or 191 observations, of 
default announcements do not Involve initiations or renewals of bank 
debt.
Thirty-five payment default announcements generate a statistically 
negative APE of -10.91% (z--8.50) with only 28.6% of the prediction 
errors positive. Seventy-two announcements of technical default, 
generally violations of net worth covenants resulting from charges 
against retained earnings, have an APE of -7.41% (z—-12.30), less 
negative than the payment default group APE, but still significantly 
negative with only 23.6% of the prediction errors positive.
There are 27 announcements in which firms’ actions cured default. 
These generate an APE of -0.23% (z—-0.31), not statistically 
significant. For 54 cases in which a bank waives default, the APE is 
2.48% (z-1.47). In 3 cases the firm obtains prior approval to pay a 
dividend that would otherwise cause technical default under the firm’s 
credit agreement; the APE for these announcements is -2.90% (z— 1.59).
In 2 announcements a firm Initiates or renews bank debt and 
reports a technical default; they have an APE of 2.94% (z—1.13). In 11 
announcements a firm initiates or renews bank debt and cures default; 
they have an APE of -2.09% (z—-1.11). Banks waive defaults and initiate 
or renew debt in 8 announcements which generate an APE of 5.35%
(z-2.06), statistically positive.
The analysis of default waivers and bank debt renewals is 
particularly interesting in light of recent findings reported In the 
bankruptcy literature. The incentives and strategic decisions of 
debtholders of firms in default are reflected In capital market
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reactions to announcements of default. Thus, following is a discussion 
of important work in this area.
Franks and Torous (1989) analyze 27 firms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
and find priority rule violations in 21 cases. Weiss (1990) examines 37 
cases of Chapter 11 filings by industrial firms and finds violation of 
priority rules in 29 cases. In both Weiss and Franks and Torous, 
secured creditors maintain priority status in most of the cases. 
Violations of priority occur primarily among unsecured creditors and 
between unsecured creditors and equityholders.
These results are consistent with arguments by Baird and Jackson 
(1988) that reorganizations allow senior creditors to renegotiate debt 
contracts and align with firm managers and equityholders to "freeze out" 
creditors with Intermediate claims. Firm managers engage in this type 
of renegotiation to maximize shareholder wealth and to salvage their 
firm-specific human capital. Senior creditors have an incentive to 
renegotiate their debt contracts when allowing firm managers to continue 
operations maximizes firm value. Baird and Jackson argue that senior 
creditors have this right if firm value is less than the face value of 
their claims.
Differences in the contract structures between bank and bond debt 
may allow banks to more easily engage in the type of contract 
renegotiation suggested by Baird and Jackson. For example, a material 
adverse change clause, common in credit agreements, allows banks to 
force contract renegotiation when the bank believes such a change has 
occurred. Moreover, monitoring by banks Increases the likelihood that 
bank debt renegotiation will occur earlier in a firm’s financial
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distress Through contract renegotiation banks can increase their 
collateral Interests so that In reorganization they receive greater 
portions of the proceeds. In other words, banks can raise their 
priority status from junior creditor to senior creditor.
This argument runs counter to Fans's (1985) suggestion that 
monitoring by banks with low priority claims benefits other outside 
claimholders by reducing their need to undertake costly and redundant 
monitoring. If banks have relatively low priority claims, we might 
expect bank monitoring to benefit shareholders. Indeed, this view 
provides a foundation for this study. If, however, banks have an option 
to increase their priority status to senior level when a firm faces 
financial distress, then banks may have de facto higher priority claims 
suggesting that their monitoring activities would not benefit 
shareholders, or even other debtholders.
Wruck (1990) also analyzes bankruptcy filings and argues that 
Chapter 11 filings represent not only costs (direct and indirect) but 
also potential benefits. She distinguishes between stock insolvency and 
flow insolvency, defining stock insolvency as negative economic net 
worth; flow insolvency as inability to meet current obligations. 
Creditors have power to force change only under flow insolvency. 
Claimholders must predict future cash flows for distressed firms to 
determine whether cash flows will resume to predistress levels 
sufficient to service debt or if a permanent reduction has occurred. If 
a permanent reduction has occurred, creditors have incentive to force a 
substantial reorganization or liquidation.
62
The above arguments suggest that the capital market response to a 
default waiver depends on whether or not a firm is in financial distress 
and, if in distress, whether firm equityholders can renegotiate debt 
contracts to their benefit. First, a bank waiver of default may signal 
that a firm is not actually in adverse financial health, but rather 
entered default as the result of a nonthreatening event. For example, a 
large writeoff may lower earnings or net worth to less than required by 
the bank but not affect cash flow, and thus ability to repay debt. 
Similarly a bank may believe a firm to be in adverse financial health, 
but assesses a reasonable probability of a return to financial health if 
the bank allows continued firm operations. In Wruck’s terms, the firm 
Is flow insolvent, but not stock insolvent. Under this interpretation, 
the capital market is expected to react in a relatively nonnegative 
manner.
Second, a bank may waive default because it assesses that a firm 
cannot generate sufficient funds to meet required payments and would be 
forced into bankruptcy. The bank may diagnose the firm’s financial 
health as one of continuing decline (a permanent reduction in cash 
flows). In Wruck’s terms, the firm is stock insolvent. If the bank's 
collateral interest in the firm is not sufficient (i.e. the bank Is a 
junior creditor), it may be optimal to the bank to allow operation under 
default while perfecting its collateral interest. Once the bank has 
achieved perfect collateral interest, it has senior creditor status and 
can align with equityholders to freeze out junior claimholders. This 
behavior would be expected given the relatively priority violations for 
unsecured creditors documented by Franks and Torous (1989) and Weiss
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(1990). This action results In less assets available for shareholders 
in the event of liquidation, but gives shareholders an option value they 
would otherwise not have. Thus, the expected market reaction is 
ambiguous.
Both of the subsamples of default waivers have significantly 
positive APEs. These results do not distinguish between the alternative 
explanations but are consistent with both. The two subsamples Involving 
default and initiation/renewals of bank debt generate positive APEs. 
Since additional credit does not have super-priority status for firms 
not in Chapter 11, the market may Interpret banks’ willingness to extend 
additional credit as a signal that a permanent cash flow reduction has 
not occurred.
B.6. Dividend announcements
In 34 cases an announcement contains information about bank debt 
and dividends; they generate a statistically negative APE of -2.48% (z—  
4.06). Eleven of these events involving an initiation or renewal of 
bank debt generate an APE of -.63% (z— 0.78), not statistically 
significant In six of the eleven initiations or renewals It Is clear 
that dividends are decreased or omitted. They have a statistically 
negative APE of -3,91% (z— 3.19) with 33.3% of the prediction errors 
positive. The same argument that applied to earnings announcements may 
apply here. Firm managers may attempt to offset negative dividend 
information by simultaneously announcing an initiation or renewal of 
bank debt.
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B.7. Security issuance or repurchase announcements
Bank debt announcements may be contaminated by news of security 
issuances or repurchases in three ways. First, a firm may issue 
securities to repay bank debt. Second, a firm may announce that 
existing bank credit will be added to proceeds from a security issue to 
fund a project. Third, a firm may obtain bank debt to repurchase 
securlties.
There are 163 announcements contaminated by news of security 
Issuance with an APE of -.18% (z— 1.04). Fifty-two announcements 
involving bank debt initiation or renewal have an APE of -0.25%
(z—-0.73), in effect normal returns. There are 28 announcements 
contaminated by news of security repurchases with an APE of 1.55%
(z—2.96), statistically significant. Fourteen announcements involve an 
initiation or renewal of bank debt generating an APE of -0.03% (z—  
0.18), not statistically significant.
Firms issued warrants to banks as part of compensation in three cases; 
they have an APE of 0.73% (z—0.54), Two cases in which a firm initiates 
or renews bank debt have an APE of 0,80% (z—0.62). One observation in 
each sample is negative.
B.8. .Retiring bank debt
Although retiring bank debt is not contaminating news per se, in 
61 cases firms retire bank debt and do not initiate or renew other bank 
debt; these generate an APE of 1.17% (z-1.58), not statistically 
significant. Eighteen announcements in which firms retire bank debt and
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initiate or renew other bank debt have a statistically positive APE of 
2.03* (z-2.10).
B.9. Ocher con Lamina t m g  events
There are 489 announcements with contaminating information that 
does not fit into the above categories; they have an APE of -1.09%
(z—-4.92), statistically negative. Approximately 26%, or 130, of these 
represent announcements in which a firm Initiated or renewed bank debt 
generating an APE of 0.29% (z—-0.42), not statistically significant. 
These results suggest that either: (1) less negative news is announced
with news of Initiation or renewal of bank debt, or (2) news of 
initiation or renewal of bank debt mitigates simultaneously announced 
negative news. Unfortunately, there is no method to distinguish cleanly 
between the two.
Separate WSJ articles within the event window contaminate 411 
announcements generating an APE of -0,56% (z— 1.98), statistically 
significant; the 179 of these involving an initiation or renewal of bank 
debt have an APE of 0,38% (z—1.03), not statistically significant. One 
hundred-twenty announcements are listed in the DJNS database as being in 
the WSJ but could not be found in the WSJ index. These announcements 
generate a statistically significant APE of -1.41%
(z— 3.56) with 39.2% of the prediction errors positive. Only five of 
these are clearly initiations or renewals from the DJNS headline; they 
have an APE of 1.54% (z-1.04).
For 80 events, it was apparent from the text of the article or 
from the WSJ index that the bank debt information had been previously
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announced; this group has a statistically Insignificant APE of 0.27% 
(z--0.36). Thirty-eight announcements In which firms initiate or renew 
bank debt generate an APE of 1.12% (z—0.75), also not statistically 
significant.
Seventy-two announcements are omitted from the final 
uncontaminated sample because they are by a financial company or a 
utility. They generate an APE of -1.08% (z— 2.92), statistically 
significant. In 48 of these a firm initiated or renewed bank debt 
generating an APE of -0.57% (z--1.76), not statistically significant,
C. Source of Announcement
A unique aspect of this study of bank debt is the inclusion of 
announcements carried only on the newswire, or Broadtape. As news 
becomes available during each day, reporters enter the information onto 
the newswire. The newswire is essentially an electronic newspaper 
available to subscribers desiring earlier access to economically 
significant news; the newswire runs throughout the day carrying news 
stories as they are announced. Once news is carried on the newswire, it 
may or may not be published by the WSJ on the following day, or even two 
or three days later. Little evidence exists on how the WSJ chooses 
which news stories it will publish from among all of the news stories 
generated each day.
Barclay and Litzenberger (1988), using intra-day price data, find 
that share price responses to newswire announcements of debt or equity 
issues occur immediately before (possibly due to insider trading) and 
after announcement times, but within the trading day. Statistically
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significant excess returns cease within two hours after the 
announcement. Market responses appear to result from newswire 
announcements, not subsequent WSJ announcements. Moreover, Thompson, 
Olsen, and Dietrich (1987) find that many firm specific newswire 
announcements are not carried by the WSJ. Thus, it is important to 
consider announcements carried on the newswire but not published by the 
WSJ .
Announcements carried only on the newswire comprise 17.8%, or 353 
observations, of the full sample. These announcements are collected, 
however, only for the years 1984-1986. They represent 37.6% of the 
LoLal o b s e r v a t i o n s  for that time period. Restricting the sample to 
initiations or renewals of bank debt, newswire only announcements 
represent 24.0% of the full sample and 42.3% of the 1984-1986 sample. 
Further restricting the 1984-1986 sample to uncontaminated 
announcements, newswire only announcements represent 55.2%.
If we define the population of bank debt initiations and renewals 
as those carried either by the WSJ or the newswire, then WSJ 
announcements represent less than 60% of the population. If the WSJ 
does not introduce selection bias in choosing which bank debt stories to 
carry, this can safely be ignored. Results from this study, however, 
suggest otherwise.
To investigate the possibility of selection bias introduced by WSJ 
editors, samples are dichotlmized into WSJ and newswire only 
announcements. The full WSJ sample generates an APE of -0.85% (z—-6.32, 
n-1,631); the comparable newswire only sample generates an APE of -0.74% 
(z— 2.26, n-353). The APEs are not statistically different from each
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other as evidenced by a means test t-statistic of 0.291. Restricting 
the sample to initiations and renewals yields APEs of 0.69% (z-4.23, 
n-676) and 0.20% (z--0.75, n-214), for the WSJ and wire only samples, 
respectively. A difference in means test between newswire and WSJ 
initiations and renewals allows rejection of the null hypothesis of 
equal group means with a t - 2.03.
The uncontaminated WSJ sample has a statistically significant APE 
of 1.25% (z—4.93, n—277); the comparable wire only sample has an 
insignificant APE of -0.18% (z— 0,35, n-96), A difference in means 
tests implies a difference in equal group means at the .05 level with a 
t-statistic of 2.28, Thus, for uncontaminated initiations and renewals 
and combined contaminated and uncontaminated initiations and renewals, 
the APE for the WSJ sample is larger and more positive than the APE for 
the newswire only sample. These results suggest that the WSJ may 
introduce selection bias in systematically choosing to carry news 
stories that induce greater price changes. Provided below is an 
explanation for why this may occur.
Intuitively, we might expect that the population of bank credit 
lines would contain proportionately more announcements of a positive or 
zero nature. That is, if banks accurately assess borrower credit 
quality initially, and if borrower quality does not vary significantly 
over time, then most announcements should be renewals or expansions 
rather than cancellations or reductions. Additionally, there may be a 
preference by firm managers to avoid negative bank debt announcements 
whenever possible, i.e. whenever immateriality can be argued.
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Thus, we night expect a distribution of positive", zeros, and 
negatives with positives and zeros representing a proportionately larger 
part of the distribution. WSJ editors may regard announcements that 
move price signifleantly as economically important news. If they choose 
to carry announcements the market deems important, they will draw 
proportionately more larger positives (because there are proportionately 
less larger negatives). This could bias results from WSJ only samples.
Since wire announcements are collected only for 1984-1986, the 
sample restricted to these years represents the population of WSJ and 
wire bank debt announcements. Analyzing the sample of 173 
uncontaminated combined WSJ and newswire announcements for the years 
1984-1986 indicates that, while the average predict ion error is smaller 
than for the full sample (0.49*) and still positive, it is statistically 
significant (z—1.77) at much weaker significance levels. The sample of 
77 uncontaminated WSJ announcements for 1984-1986 generates an APE of 
1.33* (z—3.05) while the comparable sample of 95 uncontaminated newswire 
announcements generates an APE of -0.18* (z— 0,35). A difference in 
means test rejects the null hypothesis of equal group means across these 
samples at the .05 level with t — 2.02,
In summary, all samples of initiations and renewals display a 
similar pattern. WSJ announcements are larger and more positive than 
newswire announcements indicating that samples drawn exclusively from 
the WSJ may be biased. Moreover, the means are statistically different 
within firm size groups--small and large firms. Thus, results are 
presented for the combined newswire and WSJ sample, and, for 
comparability with other studies, for the WSJ sample.
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D. Initiations and Renewals
There are 373 uncontaminated initiations and renewals which 
generate an APE of 0.88% (z—4.07), statistically significant at the 1% 
level with 53.8% of the prediction errors positive. This compares to 
the APE of 0.58% (z—3,23, 51.0% positive) for the sample of combined 
uncontaminated and contaminated initiations and renewals. These results 
are broadly consistent with results of other published and unpublished 
studies analyzing announcement effects of bank credit agreements. The 
APE of 0.88% for the uncontaminated sample in this study is larger than 
the comparable APEs in Lumraer and McConnell (1989), and Wansley, Elayan, 
and Collins (1991), and smaller than the APEs in James (1987) and Preece 
and Mullineaux (1991). Of these studies, only Preece and Mullineaux 
includes NASDAQ firms. Their sample, limited to WSJ announcements, has 
an APE of 1.00%. The uncontaminated sample of WSJ announcements in this 
study generates an APE of 1.25%, higher than that of Preece and 
Mullineaux.
The sample of 518 contaminated initiations and renewals 
(uncontaminated observations omitted) generates an APE of 0.36%
(z-0.91). This APE is statistically different from the uncontaminated 
sample APE at the .10 level with a means test t—1.88, Taken together, 
these results suggest that the contamination criteria screen out more 
less positive observations. If good and bad contaminating news is 
announced randomly with bank debt news, then the contaminating news
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should average to zero and not change the mean significantly from the 
contaminated sample to the uncontaminated sample.
D.l. Descriptive statistics for uncontaminated sample
Presented In Table 5-3 are descriptive statistics for the 
uncontaminated sample of firms announcing bank debt agreements. In 
Table 5-4 are the same statistics disaggregated by firm size. Small 
firms are below CRSP median in market value of equity; large firms are 
above median.
Agreements ranged from $1 million to $4000 million in size, with a 
median agreement size of $30 million. As percentages of market value of 
equity, they ranged from ,0402 to 52.82, with a median relative size of 
.4731. Thus, bank debt agreements represent significant external 
financing lor corporations. As discussed in Chapter 7, they represent 
relatively larger external financing than straight bond issues.
Market value of equity ranged from $1.86 million to $5170.46 
million, with a median value of $63.51 million. Median small firm size 
is 34.21 million; median large firm size is 333.07, approximately 10 
times as large. Thus, there is great disparity among the sizes of firms 
obtaining bank credit. Moreover, median relative agreement size was 
approximately twice as large for small firms, .5908, than for large 
firms, .3146.
Credit agreements are typically much shorter in maturity than 
straight bonds. Median maturity is six years, with a minimum of one
year, a maximum of fifteen. There is little difference in agreement
72
maturities across firm sizes; median values are five and seven years for 
small and large firms respectively.
Small firms are more highly levered than large firms. Median long 
term leverage, defined as book value of long term debt divided by market 
value of equity, is ,4303 for the full sample, .6304 for small firms, 
and .2997 for large firms. Furthermore, small firms use proportionately 
greater amounts of bank debt in capital structure. Bank debt is defined 
as Compustat "debt in current liabilities" less "long term debt due in 
one year." As a percentage of market value of equity, small firms’ 
median value is .1179, large firms' median Is approximately one-fourth 
as large, .0397 .
Other interesting differences between median values for small and 
large firms include: insider holdings--17% for small firms, 8% for large
firms; institutional holdings--8.77 for small firms, 29.90 for large 
firms; and number of institutional investors— 8 for small firms, 54 for 
large firms. These differences are hypothesized to have significant 
implications for capital market interpretation of firms obtaining 
additional bank debt.
We next Investigate event study results partitioned by 
characteristics of the client firms and characteristics of the credit 
agreements. Results are presented In Tables 5-5 through 5-8.
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D.2, Event Study Results Disaggregated by Firm Attributes
Event study results by firm size
Hypotheses developed about firm size each predict a negative 
relationship between the magnitude of prediction errors and firm size. 
The market value of equity for each firm is calculated as the number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by the price per share at the end of the 
estimation period (21 days before the event date). For classification 
purposes, each firm is identified as above or below median firm size 
according to the iollowing criterion. The market value of equity is 
calculated for all CRSP firms for each year in the sample, 1980-1986, 
for the trading date closest to July 1. From this sample of market 
values, the median value of firm size is established for each year. A 
firm in the sample is classified as being above or below the CRSP median 
according to the median market value for the year of the announcement. 
Below median sized firms are hereafter denoted as small firms; above 
median firms are denoted as large firms.
For the combined sample of uncontaminated and contaminated 
initiations and renewals, 42%, or 374, of the firms are large and 516 
firms are small. APEs for the two groups are 0,09% (z-0.43) and 0.93% 
lz“4.00), respectively. For the uncontaminated sample, 35.8% or 133 of 
the firms are large firms and 239 firms are small firms. The two 
samples generate APEs of 0.24% (z—0,82) and 1.24% (z—4.47), 
respectively. Moreover, 57.1% of small firm prediction errors are 
positive; 48.1% of large firm prediction errors are positive. A 
difference in means tests between small and large firms, however, fails
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to reject the null hypothesis of equal group means with a t—1.63 unless 
a one-s i ded test Is used.
Thus, event study results provide support for the firm size 
hypotheses. Furthermore, bank debt announcements generate statistically 
positive market responses only for small capitalization firms. These 
firms are hypothesized to benefit most from bank asset services because 
participants in the capital market have less incentive to collect 
Information about these firms. Thus, as Atlase hypothesizes, small 
capitalization firms' share prices may be less precise. Alternatively, 
large firms that are well monitored and/or have substantial reputation 
gain little from bank debt. Initiation or renewal of bank debt signals 
the capital market that unobservable (or unattainable at reasonable net 
cost) information for small firms is nonnegative. Because small firm 
prices are relatively imprecise, share price responses are larger.
The full sample of announcements has qual1 tatively similar 
results. The subsample of small firms generates an APE of -1.14%
(z— 7.26); the subsample of large firms generates an APE of -0.34%
(z— 1.69). These results suggest that small capitalization firms’ 
prices also adjust by a greater percentage to negative information than 
do large firms* prices. There may also be a bias created by the fact 
that firms in declining financial health have relatively smaller market 
values, and thus, are likely to be classified as small firms.
Since firm size is a significant factor in capital market 
responses to bank credi t agreement announcements, hereafter each 
category is also dlchotimized by firm size.
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Event study results by source of announcement and firm size
Firm size effects may Account for previously noted differences 
between announcement sources, though a priori, intuition suggests the 
opposite. That is, results reported above suggest that only small firms 
have positive average prediction errors for bank debt announcements, yet 
as reported below, newswire only announcements are more likely to be 
about small firms. The number of WSJ index citations is much greater 
for larger firms than smaller firms. For example, citations for General 
Motors occupy several pages annually in the WSJ index. Many small firms 
have little more than three or four WSJ citations, if any, annually. 
Partitioning the sample by source of announcement and firm size yields 
insights into how information is disseminated for small versus large 
firms.
Of all newswire announcements (Including contaminated) of 
initiations and renewals, 80.0% or 173 are about small firms. The 
remaining 41 newswire announcements are about large firms. The 
comparable sample ot WSJ announcements contained 343 or 50.7% 
announcements about small firms, 333 announcements about large firms. 
Sample sizes suggest that bank debt announcements carried only on the 
newswire are much more likely to be about small firms than large firms. 
These firms get little WSJ coverage and are too small to interest 
information collectors. These firms are expected to benefit more from 
obtaining or renewing bank debt, as reflected in larger APEs. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of APEs indicates that this Is not the case.
The combined clean and contaminated sample of initiations and 
renewals classified by firm size and source of announcement reveals that
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small firms with announcements carried by the WSJ generate a 
statistically significant positive APE of 1.17% (z—5.01, n—343); small 
firms with announcements on the newswire generate an APE of 0.45% (z—  
0.15, n—174), not statistically significant. The APEs for the WSJ and 
newswire samples are statistically different with a t — 2.18. Large 
firms with announcements carried by the WSJ generate an APE of 0.21%
(z—0.95, n—333); large firms with announcements carried on the newswire 
generate an APE of -0.85% (z—-1.40, n—41). A means test fails to reject
the null of equal group means for WSJ and newswire large firm samples.
Clean samples of initiations and renewals yield qualitatively 
similar results. The clean sample of small firm WSJ announcements has a 
statistically significant APE of 1.87% (z—5.22, n—158); the 
corresponding small firm newswire sample has an APE of 0.02% (z-0.41, 
n-82), not statistically significant. The large firm WSJ sample has an 
APE of 0.43 (z-1.52, n-119); the corresponding large firm newswire 
sample has an APE of -1.36% (z— 1.90, n-14). The statistically 
significant negative APE for large firms with announcements carried only 
the newswire is also puzzling. With only two positive prediction errors 
of the 14 observations in that sample, the statistically negative 
average may persist with a larger sample size.
Event study results by prior share price runup
Given the importance of firm size and the lack of coverage by 
financial press of many small firms, we examine the Importance of 
previous share price runupa regarding market response to bank debt 
announcements. Statistically negative share price runups for firms may
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indicate capital market concern of financial health. Thus, we calculate 
share price runups for days -30 to -11. The runup is terminated at day 
-11 to avoid effects of possible leakage of news regarding bank debt. 
Results are reported in Table 5-6.
Twenty-nine firms In the clean sample have statistically negative 
(at the .10 level) share price runups. They have an APE of 2.40% 
(z-3.40) with 58,6% of the prediction errors positive. Firms without 
negative share price runups have an APE of 0.75% (z—3.26) with 53.5% 
positive prediction errors. Thus, the capital market interprets bank 
debt issues as positive signals even if firms do not display negative 
prior stock returns. The result suggests that bank debt is valuable for 
financially healthy firms, but more valuable for firms in declining 
financial health. Moral hazard problems are more likely to be severe 
for these firms implying that additional monitoring may be more 
valuable.
It is further interesting to investigate the different reactions 
to initiations and renewals disaggregated by prior share price 
performance. Firms with negative share price runups that initiated bank 
debt (n-17) have an APE of -0.17% (z—0.20), not statistically 
significant. Firms with normal prior share price performance that 
initiated bank debt (n-203) have an APE of 0.64% (z-2.09), statistically 
significant. Firms with negative share price runups that renewed bank 
debt (n-12) have an APE of 6.05% (z-5.06), statistically significant. 
Firms with normal prior share price performance that renewed bank debt 
(n-141) have an APE of 0.91% (z-2.58), statistically significant.
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Event study results by dividend history and firm size
Hypotheses developed concerning a firm’s dividend payment history 
predict that firms which pay regular dividends may be forced to enter 
capital markets periodically subjecting them to periodic monitoring and 
r ev i e w  T h e s e  firms are h y p o t h e s i z e d  to be b e t t e r  monitored than firms 
that do not pay regular dividends and consequently, do not enter capital 
markets as often. Thus, firms that paid recent dividends are 
hypothesized to generate relatively smaller APEs than firms that have 
not paid recent dividends.
The uncontaminated sample of 137 firms that paid dividends in the 
six months (120 trading days) prior to the bank debt announcement 
generate an APE of 0.47% (z-1.47). The comparable sample of 235 firms 
that did not pay dividends within the prior 6 months generates an APE of 
1.13% (z—4.03), A difference in means test cannot reject the null of 
equal group means (t—1.031). Although not statistically different, the 
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis of larger announcement effects 
for firms that do not pay dividends.
Given the previous results about firm size, however, it is prudent 
to control at least partially for firm size. The uncontaminated sample 
of 198 small firms that did not pay a recent dividend has an APE of 
1.41% (z—4.60); the comparable sample of 42 small firms that paid a 
recent dividend generate an APE of 0.45% (z-0.70). Thus, the pattern of 
results remains consistent with the dividend hypothesis even when the 
sample is restricted to small firms. Eighty-nine large firms that paid 
a recent dividend have an APE of 0.30% (z—1.10). Forty-four large firms 
that did not pay a recent dividend have an APE of 1.08% (z— 0.14).
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Large firms do not generate statistically significant announcement 
effects regardless of whether or not they paid a recent dividend.
Event study results by auditor quality and firm size
The hypothesis concerning auditor quality predicts larger APEs for 
firms that have non-Big Eight auditors since the accounting literature 
provides evidence that Big Eight auditors provide higher qual Ity 
auditing, and thus higher quality monitoring services.
The auditor name could not be found for seven firms which generate 
an APE of 1,36% (z—1.60), Fifty-one firms employing non-Big Eight 
auditors have an APE of 0.61% (z-1.04). The remaining 314 firms 
employed Big Eight auditors producing an APE of 0.92% {z—3.77). None of 
the APEs are significantly different from each other. Thus, these 
results do not provide support for the auditor hypothesis.
No additional support is provided with disaggregation by firm 
size. Small firms with Big-Eight auditors (n—188) have an APE of 1,37% 
(z—4.19); 47 comparable small firms with non-Big-Eight auditors have an 
APE of 0.59% (z-1.03). Large firms with Big-Eight auditors (n-127) have 
an APE of 0.24% (z-0.85); four large firms with non-Big-Eight auditors 
have an APE ot 0.84% (z—0.19). Thus, bank debt announcement effects 
appear to be unrelated to auditor status.
Event study results by leverage and firm size
There are alternative hypotheses about the expected effect of 
leverage on share price responses. One explanation predicts that 
relatively highly levered firms will have smaller announcement effects
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because they are already well monitored by bondholders. Another 
explanation predicts that relatively highly levered firms will have 
larger announcement effects because monitoring intensity is an 
increasing function of leverage.
The results support neither hypothesis even when controlling for 
firm size. There are 324 firms with data available for long term debt. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of long term debt to 
market value of equity. The median is calculated from the sample of 324 
firms. The sample of firms with below median leverage produces an APE 
of 0.84% (z—2.48); the corresponding above median leverage sample 
produces an APE of 1.32% (z-3.47). Small firms with below median 
leverage (r»“81) produce an APE of 1.26% (z —2.19); corresponding above 
median leverage small firms (n—113) produce an APE of 1.87% (z—4.28). A 
difference in means test cannot reject the null at the .10 level. Large 
firms with below median leverage (n-80) produce an APE of 0.38%
(z—1,19); corresponding above median leverage large firms (n—50) produce 
an APE of 0,12% (z— 0,01). Thus, capital market responses to bank debt 
announcements appear to be unrelated to existing leverage.
Event study results by relative exist ing bank debt end firm size
Alternative hypotheses regarding existing bank debt are similar to 
leverage hypotheses. Monitoring intensity may increase with relatively 
higher amounts of debt leading to larger prediction errors. 
Alternatively, relatively higher amounts of existing bank debt may 
indicate higher current monitoring levels leading to smaller share price 
responses.
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Bank debt Is defined as Compustat "debt in current liabilities" 
less "long term debt due in one year." This data is available and 
nonzero for 124 firms. Relative bank debt is bank debt divided by 
market value of equity. Sixty-two firms with below median bank debt 
have an APE of 0.81 (z—1,80), statistically significant at the .10 
level. Corresponding above median bank debt firms have an APE of 0.54 
(z—0.77). A differences in means test fails to reject the null with a 
t — 0.611. Thus, the relative bank debt hypothesis is not supported by 
the full clean sample,
Disaggregating by firm size, however, reveals interesting results. 
Small firms with below median hank debt (n—22) have an APE of 0.57 
(z-0.30), not statistically significant. Corresponding small firms with 
above median bank debt (n—41) have an APE of 1.37 (z—1.96). A 
difference in means test falls to reject the null with a t -  0.727.
Below median bank debt large firms (n-40) have an APE of 0.94% 
(z-2.02), statistically significant with 57.5% of the prediction errors 
positive. Above median bank debt large firms (n—21) have an APE of 
-1.08% (z--1.42)t not statistically significant with 38.1% of the 
prediction errors positive. A difference in means test rejects the null 
of equal means with a t — 2.114. Thus, there is a bank debt effect 
within the large firm sample. Large firms with below median bank debt 
have a statistically significant positive APE. This is a departure from 
the majority of other large firm classifications which have 
statistically zero APEs.
The result suggests that large firms benefit from additional bank 
debt only if they have relatively smaller amounts of existing bank debt.
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This is consistent with a monitoring hypothesis that firms with 
relatively smaller amounts of existing bank debt benefit more from 
additional monitoring provided by new bank debt.
Event study results by insider holdings and firm size
Hypotheses regarding insider holdings predict that firms with 
higher insider holdings should experience smaller announcement effects 
than firms with lower insider holdings because firm insiders that hold 
larger portions of firm equity are expected to exhibit behavior 
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
Only 147 firms in the sample have insider holdings reported in 
Value Line. Median insider holdings are calculated from this sample. 
Seventy-two firms with below median insider holdings generate an APE of 
0.81% (z-2.05); the comparable above median insider sample produces an 
APE of -0.03% (z—0.48), not statistically significant. The pattern of 
results is consistent with the developed hypothesis, although the means 
are not statistically different.
It is reasonable to expect that larger firms have smaller 1nsIder 
holdings Thus, the sample is further subdivided by firm size. Small 
firms with below median insider holdings (n-14) produce an APE of 2.07% 
(z—1.77); small firms with above median insider holdings (n—41) have an 
APE of 0.59% (z—0.87). Large firms with below median insider holdings 
(n—41) produce an APE of 0.53% (z—1.33); above median insider holding 
large firms (n—51) have an APE of -0.37% (z--1.04).
Thus, even when controlling for firm size, the pattern of event 
study results is consistent with the hypothesis for insider holdings.
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Large firms do not have statistically significant APEs regardless of 
insider holdings status.
Event study results by institutional holdings and firm size
The percentage of common equity held by institutions is collected 
from Standard and Poor’s Security Owners Guide. It proxies for the 
degree of monitoring provided by large blockholders. Hypotheses predict 
that excess returns are smaller for firms with relatively large 
Institutional holdings because these firms are assumed to be better 
monitored.
Institutional holdings are available for 302 clean observations. 
Firms with below median institutional holdings have a statistically 
significant APE of 1.23% (z-3.99). In contrast, firms with above median 
institutional holdings have an insignificant APE of 0.02% (z—0,33).
Thus, event study results are consistent with institutional monitoring 
hypotheses. Moreover, APEs across the two samples are statistically 
different with a t—1.988.
As expected, though, firm size and institutional holdings are 
positively correlated. Thus, we disaggregate by firm size to further 
analyze the importance of institutional holdings. Hie institutional 
monitoring hypothesis is supported within the small firm group. Results 
are weaker and not statistically significant for large firms. Smal1 
firms with below median institutional holdings have an APE of 1,37%
(z—3.62, n-117); comparable above median institutional holding small 
firms have an APE of 0.09% (z— 0.02, n-59), not statistically 
significant. A difference in means test has a t—1.842. Large firms
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with below median institutional holdings have a statistically 
insignificant APE of 0.73% (z—0.56, n—34); comparable above median 
institutional holding large firms have an insignificant APE of -0.00%
n-92), also noL statistically significant. The APEs for large 
firms are not statistically different at the .10 level with a t-0.236. 
Thus, the institutional monitoring hypothesis receives support 
within the small firm sample. The main result is that bank monitoring 
is valuable only for small firms that have relatively small 
institutional holdings. It is important to note that the results do not 
provide clear evidence that institutions monitor. The ambiguity arises 
because the results do not tell whether institutions actually monitor or 
whether their number serves as a measure of how well firms are currently 
monitored. We might expect institutional investors to avoid firms about 
which they know little--firms that are not well monitored, leaving the 
ones they choose as better monitored firms.
Event study results by number of Inst itut ional investors and firm size 
We also investigate the Importance of the number of institutional 
Investors to announcement effects of bank debt. The number of 
institutional investors may contain different Information from the 
percentage of Institutional holdings. For example, a large number of 
institutional investors may indicate a large number of security analysts 
following a firm; the number of security analysts does not necessarily 
increase with the percentage of institutional holdings. Median number 
of institutional investors is calculated from the clean sample of firms 
with available data
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APEs are statistically significant only for firms with below 
median number of institutional investors, even when controlling for firm 
size. All size firms with below median number of Institutional 
Investors have an APE of 1.38% (z-3.94); firms with above median number 
of Institutional investors have an APE of -0.18% (z—-0.22), not 
statistically signifleant.
Disaggregating by firm size, the main results hold. The sample of 
134 small firms with below median number of institutional investors 
generate an APE of 1.29% (z-3,46); the comparable sample of 42 above
median small firms generate an APE of -0.24% (z— 0.17). A means test
between the APEs has a t—1.604, The sample of 21 large firms with below 
median number of institutional Investors generates a statistically 
significant APE of 1.94% (z-1.96); the comparable sample of 105 above
median large firms generates an APE of -0,15% (z;— 0.15). The APEs are
statistically different at the .10 level with a t—1.762.
Large firms and small firms alike only benefit from bank 
monitoring If they have relatively few institutional investors.
Event study results by renewal status
We next analyze event study results for samples grouped by renewal 
status of agreement, Luismer and McConnell (1989) find positive APEs for 
renewals and statistically zero APEs for new credit agreements, results 
that present an anomaly. Since all but five firms in LM’s sample of 
loan initiations had some prior bank financing, we also Invest Igate 
whether there is a relationship between prior bank debt and announcement 
effects of new bank debt. Presented In Tables 5-9, 5-10, 5-11 are
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results for renewals and Initiations using Ill’s classifications and my 
criterion. We then disaggregate by status of prior bank debt, I.e. did 
firms securing apparently new credit agreements have prior bank 
borrowing.
Luraner and UcConnel1 criteria
bummer and McConnell classify a bank debt announcement as new if 
it is not a renewal, replacement, extens ion, or expansion of another 
credit agreement; all other agreements are classified as renewals. 
Announcements by firms securing a new credit agreement with one bank to 
replace a credit, agreement at another bank are categorized as 
initiations. Whether or not these are Initiations or renewals is 
debatable. Therefore, we present results based on these criteria and 
results with new agreements with new banks reclassified as renewals.
Using the LM criteria for new versus renewal agreements, there are 
571 clean and contaminated new agreements with an APE of 0.14% (z—0.46), 
not statistically significant; 319 renewals have an APE of 1.36% 
(z-4.94). Restricting samples to clean announcements yields different 
results, For the uncontaminated sample, 220 new agreements generate an 
APE of 0.58% (z-2.06), statistically significant, and 164 clean renewal 
agreements have an APE of 1.41% (z—4.09).
This is strikingly different from LM’s finding of statistical 
insignificance for all classifications of new agreements. Moreover, the 
subsample of this study most comparable to LM’s, the sample of WSJ 
Initiations by NYSE/AMEX firms generates an APE of 0.78% (z—2.02), 
statistically significant at the .05 level. Thus, we cannot attribute
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differences in significance solely to the richer sample of small firms 
in my study. My sample differs from LM by Including NASDAQ firms, 
typically much smaller than listed firms. LM’s sample of initiations 
has 176 observations between the years 1984-1986, the years covered by 
my sample. My comparable sample (WSJ NYSE/AMEX announcements only) has 
only 104 observations, suggesting that my screening criteria classified 
more observations as contaminated.
The finding of significance for initiations is especially 
important since Lummer and McConnell’s result presents an anomaly. 
Initiations of credit agreements in their sample generate insignificant 
average share price responses, while revisions generate statistically 
significant average share price responses. This result is inconsistent 
with financial theory which predicts that rational investors would 
anticipate the wealth increases generated from revisions and capitalize 
these upon initiation of credit agreements.
LM criterion and firm size
Results reported above suggest that firm size and source of the 
announcement are Important. The sample for this study differs In these 
key characteristics from Lummer and McConnell. First, this study’s 
sample includes NASDAQ firms, typically much smaller In market value of 
equity than NYSE/AMEX firms. Second, it includes announcements carried 
exclusively on the newswire.
The clean sample of small (below CRSP median size) firms 
announcing new credit agreements has an APE of 0.75% (z—2.22), 
statistically significant and the large firm sample has an APE of 0,17%
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(z-0.36), not statistically significant. The clean sample of small 
firms announcing renewals generates a statistically significant APE of 
2.25% (z—4.73), and large firms have an APE of 0.39% (z-0.87), not 
statistically significant. Thus, the previous pattern of firm size 
results holds when events are classified by renewal status: APEs are
larger for small firms than large firms.
There are 149 announcements of new credit agreements carried by 
the WSJ which generate a statistically significant APE of 1.09%
(z—3.08). The 124 small firm renewal announcements carried by the WSJ 
have an APE of 1.55% (z—4.16), statistically significant.
Newswire only announcements generate insignificant announcement 
effects regardless of renewal status: 71 new credit agreements have an
APE of -0.50% (z--0.84); 25 renewal announcements have an APE of 0.71% 
(z-0.74) .
Disaggregating the WSJ samples of new agreements and renewals by 
firm size reveals that the firm size effect persists. Ninety-five small 
firms with new loan agreements reported in the WSJ have a statistically 
.significant APE of 1.50 (z-3.13); the comparable sample of 54 large 
firms has an APE of 0.37% (z—0.97), not statistically significant. 
Sixty-three small firms with renewals carried by the WSJ have an APE of 
2,43% (z-4.42); the corresponding 65 large firms have an APE of 0.47% 
(z-1.16).
Newswire announcements have statistically zero APEs throughout 
similar groupings, but the general relationship between firm size and 
APE remains.
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Thus, the result that announcements of renewed credit agreements 
generate larger responses from the capital market than announcements of 
new agreements persists. Following Is a possible explanation. Banks 
Initially assess firm quality, screen out a number of low quality firms, 
and grant Initial credit lines to remaining firms. This signals that 
these firms are of relatively higher quality and induces a positive 
market reaction for firms about which the market knows little. Over 
time banks gain additional information so that at maturity a further 
screening of firms occurs. Extensions or expansions of agreements by 
banks Increase the precision of the capital market's assessment of 
firms’ quality. The symmetric response for poor quality firms is a 
negative market response to cancellations and reductions of credit 
agreements documented by LM and this study.
The major result from this analysis is a statistically significant 
positive APE for the sample of new credit agreements. The lack of 
significance for this group in Lummer and McConnell presented an anomaly 
and suggests that their sample may reflect selection bias. The APE for 
initiations is statistically positive in this study only for the small 
firm sample. Since the result depends upon firm size, it is likely that 
LM's sample of NYSE/AMEX firms did not contain a sufficient number of 
small firms to generate a statistically significant APE. Furthermore, 
LM’s sample sizes for comparable time periods are larger suggesting that 
my screening criteria classified more observations as contaminated.
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Event study results by status of prior bank debt
To refine the concept of a new and renewed credit agreement, 
firms' 10K reports and Moody's Industrial Manuals are searched for
evidence of bank borrowings prior to announcement of "new" agreements.
In question is whether the market reaction to a new credit agreement
depends upon whether a new credit agreement supplements existing bank 
borrowings or Is new in the sense that a firm did not have prior bank 
borrowings. Results are reported In Tables 5-12 and 5-13.
For 75 firms that had no prior bank borrowings under a credit
agreement, the average prediction error is -0.12% (z—-0.00), not 
significantly different from zero. These are firms for which a new bank 
debt agreement represents new bank debt. In terms of monitoring these 
firms did not employ bank monitors before the announcement of interest.
For 100 announcements in which the agreement Is not identified as 
being a renewal, replacement, or expansion, but in which firms had prior 
bank borrowings under a credit agreement (as evidenced by notes payable 
under a credit agreement listed In Moody’s Industrial Manual or 10K 
report) the APE Is a statistically significant 0.86% (z—2.21). This 
result Is different from LM and may be attributable to the richer sample 
of small firms included in this study.
Twenty-six firms secured new agreements but apparently already had 
open lines of credit. They generated an APE of -0.10 (z— 0,27), not 
statistically significant. Six firms had "bank loans" listed on their 
balance sheets in Moody’s and have an APE of -0.36 (z--0.24), also not 
stat ist ically s igni fleant.
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The analysis of renewals in this study Is unique In that dollar 
expansions are analyzed separately from maturity extensions. U4 combine 
these with other favorable revisions. Uansley, Elayan, and Collins 
(1991) create ambiguity by using the terra "renewal" In some places and 
"expansion" in other places in referring to apparently the same group.
It is not clear whether maturity extensions are In their final sample.
The sample of 141 dollar expansion announcements generates a 
statistically positive APE of 1.49% (z-3.82) with 59.6% of the 
prediction errors positive. Twelve maturity extensions produce an APE 
of 3.45% (z-2.79) with five of the prediction errors positive. Nine 
credit agreements are renewed on more favorable terms than before (e.g. 
lower interest rates or less collateral, but not an increased borrowing 
limit) generating an APE of 1.58% (z-1.80). Two bank credit agreements 
are renewed on less favorable terras than before (e.g. higher interest 
rates, more collateral, or tighter covenants) and have an APE of -4.20% 
(z— 1.19); neither of the observations are positive. It Is not clear 
from the evidence whether It Is the renewal nature of bank debt 
agreements that Is more positive or if it is the combination of more 
money being committed with a renewal.
Given the different results between WSJ and newswire announcements 
and between new and renewed rredit agreements, it is Interesting to note 
the relative number of dollar expansion announcements In the WSJ and 
wire samples, respectively. There are 25 dollar expansion announcements 
for the newswire only sample representing 26.88% of that sample. There 
are 116 dollar expansion announcements for the WSJ announcement sample 
representing 43.28% of that sample. Since dollar expansion
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announcements are significantly positive, the different proportions of 
new and renewal announcements from each source could help explain the 
lack of statistical significance for the wire sample.
Dollar expansion agreements are further categorized by firm size. 
For dollar expansions, the firm size effect persists with average 
prediction errors of 2.05% (z—3.83, n—83) and 0.69% (z—1.38, n-58) for 
small firms and large firms, respectively.
The only sub-group of "new" agreements to generate statistically 
significant APEs is the sample in which firms had prior bank borrowings 
under a credit agreement. Dichotimizing this sample by firm size 
reveals that the announcement effect is statistically significant only 
for small firms. The small firm sample has an APE of 1.11% (z—2.21, 
n—68); large firms have an APE of 0.33% (z—0.67, n—32).
In summary, these results suggest that firms only benefit from 
additional bank monitoring if they are relatively small and currently 
have borrowing under a credit agreement. Initiations of credit 
agreements by firms with existing bank borrowings may be considered to 
have a renewal component. Thus, the capital market regards the renewal 
component in a firm-bank relationship as important.
Event study results by nature of previous relat ionship with bank
It has been argued in other studies that perhaps banks gain an 
informational advantage relative to the capital market over time and do 
not possess an advantage at the outset of a bank debt agreement. 
Continuing the argument, banka do not necessarily possess superior 
information processing technology, but rather are given access to
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private information over time and thereby develop a comparative 
advantage relative to the capital market. This argument may appear to 
explain the difference between new and renewal announcement effects but 
does not solve the anomaly regarding this difference. If renewals 
create value because banks gain informational advantages over time, 
rational investors who form unbiased expectations should anticipate 
renewals and capitalize any value creation upon announcements of new 
agreements,
Thus, it is particularly interesting to investigate agreements In 
which one (or a group) of financial Institutions replaced another group 
as a firm’s lender. The former lender (monitor) that may have an 
informational advantage Is replaced with a new lender (monitor) that has 
not had opportunity to establish an informational advantage. The 
central question is whether bank relationships create value because 
banks accumulate private information over time or because banks have a 
comparative advantage in private Information collection and processing.
As shown in Table 5-14, in 41 clean announcements it Is apparent 
that the agreement is with firms’ previous banks generating an APE of 
2.05% (z-2.88), statistically significant. It Is apparent from the 
article for 18 announcements that a new agreement is with banks 
different from firms’ previous banks, generating an APE of 2.67%
(z—2.21), statistically significant with 13 of the prediction errors 
positive. All 18 firms in this sample are small firms. Thus, It cannot 
be argued that bank debt only sends positive signals about firm value if 
banks have gained an informational advantage about a firm over time.
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To further analyze this result, the change-bank group and same- 
bank group are further restricted to dollar expansion announcements. 
Lummer and McConnell classify agreements as new if they are with new 
banks and replaced other agreements at different banks. The APE for 
expansion announcements with previous banks is 1,70% (z-2.60), 
statistically sign!lieant. The APE for 14 expansion announcements with 
a new banks is 3.79% (z—2.66), statistically significant. The 
combination change bank-dollar expansion announcements represent 14 of 
the total 18 uncontarainated announcements in which firms changed banks.
These results suggest that the action by a lender to commit more 
money to a borrower sends a positive signal, not just the renewal action 
by a bank that may have an information advantage. New relationships 
that replace other banking relationships are "renewals" in one sense of 
the term. This evidence, combined with results reported above 
suggesting that bank credit agreements are valuable only for firms with 
existing bank debt, indicate that the "renewal" nature of bank debt is 
valuable. This is consistent with Fama’s (1985) argument that the short 
term nature of bank debt and the periodic review and monitoring it 
entails lowers agency costs for firms.
Event study results by exchange listing and firm size
Since this study differs from other published studies by including 
NASDAQ firms in the sample, it Is interesting to investigate differences 
between average prediction errors for exchange listed firms and non­
exchange listed firms. It can be argued that the organized exchanges, 
NYSE and AMEX, provide monitoring and certification services to their
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listed firms. This argument predicts that additional monitoring will be 
more valuable for non-listed firms than for listed firms. Event study 
results disaggregated by exchange listing status are shown in 
Table 5-15.
The average prediction error for the sample of 2 36 NYSE/AMEX firms 
is 0.67% (z—2.44), statistically significant. The average prediction 
error for 136 NASDAQ firms is 1.26% (z—3.52), also statistically 
significant. Thus, the general relationship is as expected although a 
difference in means test implies that equality cannot be rejected.
Since NASDAQ firms are typically much smaller than exchange listed 
firms, it is important to control for firm size. The sample of 123 
small NYSE/AMEX firms generates an APE of 1.21% (z—2.87); the 
corresponding sample of 117 small NASDAQ firms generates an APE of 1.27% 
(z—3.46). The sample of 113 large NYSE/AMEX firms generates an APE of 
0.08% (z-0.53); the corresponding sample of 20 large NASDAQ firms 
generates an APE of 1.14% (z—0.85). Thus, it appears that differences 
between announcement effects of exchange listed firms and non-exchange 
listed firms are attributable primarily to differences in firm size.
Summary of event study results by firm attributes
The most important determinant of share price response to bank 
debt announcement among firm attributes is firm size. Average two day 
prediction errors are positive and statistically significant only for 
small firms. Moreover, virtually all subclassifications of small firms 
have statistically significant average two day prediction errors. The
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sample of uncontaminated large firm observations, and virtually all 
subclassification, have insignificant average two day prediction errors.
Another important determinant of share price response is the 
number of institutional investors holding equity of a firm. Firms with 
below median number of institutional investors have a statistically 
significant two day average prediction error; corresponding above median 
firms have an insignificant two day APE. Furthermore, the APEs are 
statistically different at the .01 level. Similar results obtain using 
the percentage of common equity held by institutional investors.
The institutional investor results hold even when comparisons are 
made within small and large firm samples. The percentage of 
institutional holdings is important within the small firm sample. The 
number ot institutional investors is important within the large firm 
sample. In all cases, firms with above median institutional holdings 
have statistically insignificant APEs.
D.3. Event study results disAggregated by agreement attributes 
event study results by type of agreement
Different types of bank debt agreements define the structure of 
agreements between banks and firms. Four specific categories are 
employed in this study; a fifth category includes agreements not 
otherwise classifiable. The first category includes agreements 
identified as "revolving," It includes revolving credit agreements, 
revolving credit facilities, revolving loan agreements, etc. The second 
category Includes agreements identified as credit lines, lines of 
credit, straight lines of credit, etc. The third category includes
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agreements identified as term loans. The fourth category Includes 
agreements combining one type from the first or second categories with a 
term loan. Agreements in this category include credit agreements with 
immediate term loan borrowing and agreements with a delayed conversion 
to term loan features The fifth category includes agreements 
identified as loan agreements, credit agreements, credit facilities, 
etc. that could not be categorized into the previous categories.
Disaggregating by type is important because different agreements 
may have important implications for how banks monitor firms. Revolving 
agreements are usually more formalized agreements that allow firms to 
draw down and repay funds repeatedly up to a certain dollar limit within 
a certain time period. Straight lines of credit allow firms to borrow 
up to a certain limit and then repay funds at maturity. Term loans 
allow firms to borrow a certain dollar amount and repay funds at the end 
of a certain term.
Results are presented in Tables 5-16 and 5-17. Average prediction 
errors are significantly positive only for revolving credit agreements 
and straight lines of credit. The uncontaminated sample of 123 
revolving agreement announcements has an APE of 0.98% (z—2.39). Eighty- 
four uncontaminated straight line of credit announcements have an APE of 
1,57% (z-3.65). Though the APE is larger for straight lines of credit, 
it is not significantly different from the APE for revolving credit 
agreements. Moreover, omitting one observation with a 45,4% prediction 
error (the highest PE from the entire sample) from the sample of 
straight lines of credit causes the APE for that sample to fall to 
1.04%, close to the APE for revolving agreements. Thus, there is
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virtually no difference between the two categories of types of 
agreements that generate statistically positive APEs.
Although technically revolving credit agreements are structured 
differently from straight lines of credit, from reading the articles It 
appeared that some WSJ reporters and/or some firm representatives use 
the two terms somewhat interchangeably. Straight lines of credit are 
not called revolving if they are not, but many revolving credit 
agreements are referred to elsewhere In their respective articles as 
"lines of credit" or "credit lines" without the "revolving" modifier. 
Straight lines of credit are referred to using similar terms. Thus, the 
empirical distinction between these two types of agreements is not 
c1 ear.
Seven uncontaminated announcements of term loan agreements have an 
APE of 0.14% (z—-0.11); three prediction errors are positive. Although 
the sample size is small, this suggests that "bond" type loans similar 
to straight public bonds do not affect shareholder wealth.
There are 115 announcements of combination credit agreements. The 
APE of this sample is 0.54% (z-1.49), not statistically significant. If 
a higher level of monitoring results under both types of line of credit 
agreements than term loans, then similar monitoring should take place in 
the early years of a combination agreement.
The "other" category contains announcements of agreements 
identified as "credit agreements," "loan agreements," and "credit 
facilities." These agreements are often times similar in nature to 
combination agreements. The uncontaminated sample of these contains 41
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observat ions and generates art APE of 0,28% (z—0.42), not significantly 
different from zero.
We disaggregate the above results by firm size to investigate 
whether certain types of agreements are more valuable for smaller or 
larger firms. The uncontaminated sample of 44 large firms announcing 
revolving agreements has a statistically significant APE of 1.27%
(z-2.14). This result is striking in that it is one of the very few 
categorizations of large firms that generate statistically positive 
APEs. Samples of other types of agreements for large firms, albeit 
small sample sizes in most cases, do not generate statistically 
significant APEs. Large firm announcements of "other" types of 
agreements have an APE of -1.16% (z— 1.56, n-13). Straight lines of 
credit for large firms generate an APE of 0.90% (z— 1.38, n-15). Term 
loan announcements for large firms generate an APE of -0.42% (z--0,54, 
n—4). Fifty-aeven combination agreements by large firms have an APE of 
-0.37% (z—-0.45). Results for large firms are roughly consistent with 
results for the sample not partitioned by firm size.
Small firm samples produce statistically positive APEs only for 
straight lines of credit and combination agreements. Thirty small firms 
enter into "other" types of agreements generating an APE of 0.90%
(z—30). Seventy-nine small firms that enter into revolving agreements 
have an APE of 0.83% (z-1.39). Sixty-nine small firms announce straight 
lines of credit generating an APE of 1.72% (z—3.39). Three 
announcements of term loans by small firms generate an APE of 0.88% 
(z-0.46). Fifty-eight small firms enter into combination agreements 
generating a statistleally significant APE of 1.43% (z-2 . 55) .
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In summary, results suggest that only bank debt structured as 
credit 1ines, revolving or not, generates benefits for firm 
shareholders.
Event study results by collateral arrangement of agreement
For a small set of announcements, Information about collateral Is 
provided. It can be argued that if a bank Is given greater collateral 
In an agreement then the monitoring of certain actions of the firm would 
be reduced. Under secured agreements banks may rely on collateral 
liquidation for at least partial repayment of borrowings under an 
agreement. Thus, banks with secured agreements are more likely to be 
concerned with monitoring the value and status of the collateral. 
Monitoring one specific asset or group of assets reduces the posslb llity 
of other agents beneflttlng from that specific monitoring. If banks 
perfectly monitor and respond to the value of their collateral, firm 
management’s ability to transfer wealth from debt holders to 
shareholders is reduced.
In contrast, under an unsecured agreement banks might be expected 
to monitor the actions of firm management that directly affect the cash 
flow and debt service capability of the firm. This Is more likely to 
benefit other claimants of the firm, but again, management’s abl lity to 
expropriate bondholder wealth is reduced.
If these two concerns of monitoring could be neatly dlchotimlzed, 
it could be argued that the first monitoring concern, that of monitoring 
collateral value, would benefit shareholders less than the other 
monitoring activity. The resulting expectation about relative size of
101
APEs Is that secured agreements would generate smaller APEs than 
unsecured agreements.
An alternative argument concerning the importance of collateral is 
that of a sorting or selection process when bank debt agreements are 
made. It can be argued that a firm for which banks require collateral 
in an agreement is more likely to have questionable financial health. 
These types of firms could benefit more from additional monitoring than 
firms in better financial health. This same selection process, however, 
may signal new information that a firm is in questionable financial 
health inducing negative share price responses. Thus, there is no 
unambiguous prediction by the sorting or selection process argument.
The question is an empirical one. The results are shown in Table 5-18.
There are A3 announcements of secured agreements which generate a 
statistically significant average prediction error of 1.54% (z—2,08). 
Fifty-seven announcements of unsecured agreements generate an APE of 
0.82% (z-1.16), not significantly different from zero. Information 
about the collateral arrangement is not provided in 2 72 announcements 
producing an APE of 0,79% (z—3.40), statistically significant.
Omitting distressed firms, the difference between secured and 
unsecured agreements disappears. The average prediction error for 
secured agreements falls to 0.65% (from 1.85%) with the omission of four 
distressed firms. Thus, it is clear that shareholders of distressed 
firms that get bank debt, even if it is secured, benefit significantly.
Given the importance of distressed firms to this issue, it is 
especially Important to control for firm size. Six large firms 
announcing secured bank debt agreements have an APE of -1.51% (z— 0.78),
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not statistically significant. Large firms announcing unsecured 
agreements have an APE of 0.30% (z—0,33), also not statistically 
significant. Thirty-seven small firms announcing secured agreements 
have an APE of 2.04% (z-2.55), statistically significant. Small firms 
announcing unsecured agreements generated an APE of 1.14% (z—1.21) with 
a sample size of 35.
Announcements of unsecured credit agreements carried only on the 
newswire have an average prediction error of 2.64% (z—2.10) with a 
sample of 11. This represents a departure from all other categories of 
newswire announcements which have statistically zero APEs.
In summary, the results suggest that collateral Is relatively 
unimportant in the capital market reaction’s to bank debt announcements.
Event study results by purposs of agreement
Firm managers wishing to signal certain information by announcing 
bank debt may affect Interpretation of an announcement by giving or 
withholding additional Information regarding the purpose of the bank 
debt. Thus, observations in the sample are categorized by the stated 
purpose of the bank debt. Tables 5-19 and 5-20 contain results 
disaggregated by purpose.
The purpose was not provided in the text of 150 of the 372 
uncontaminated announcements. The capital market responds favorably to 
these announcements as evidenced by an APE of 0.74 (z—2.16), 
statistically significant. Thus, the positive announcement effects of 
bank debt announcements do not rely on additional information provided 
about intended uses of the funds. A specific purpose was given in 223
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announcements generating an APE of 0,98% (z—3.50). Although this sample 
has a slightly higher mean, a difference in means test between the no 
purpose APE and the specific purpose APE falls to reject the null of 
iijual means at the .10 level with a t - 0.45.
APEs are significantly positive for two of the groups of 
announcements providing a specific purpose. Forty-eight uncontaminated 
announcements of bank debt agreements to repay other debt induce a 
statistically significant APE 1.16% (z-1.92). This result Is noteworthy 
because these bank debt Issues do not represent a leverage increase for 
these firms. Thus, tax related leverage arguments cannot solely explain 
positive share price responses. The general purpose/working capital 
category has a statistically significant positive APE of 1.04% (z—3.05),
Forty-three firms state capital expenditure as the purpose and 
generate an APE of 0.28% (z-0.43), not statistically significant. Ten 
agreements to be used for unspecified acquisitions have an APE of 3.15% 
(z—1.56), Four agreements that backup commercial paper have an APE of 
0.95% (z-0.99).
APEs are not statistically different from zero in any of the 
"purpose" categories for large firms. For small firms, only the 
"capital expenditure" group and the "commercial paper backup" group lack 
statistical significance.
Results categorized by stated purpose are interesting because they 
provide evidence about alternative hypotheses of the positive 
announcement effects generated by bank debt announcements. Wansley, 
Elayan, and Collins (1991) hypothesize that an Initiation or renewal of 
bank debt signals positive information about a firm’s "investment
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opportunity set." Though the argument Is not developed rigorously, the 
resulting prediction is that firms with greater investment opportunity 
sets experience larger abnormal returns upon bank debt announcements. 
That firms also experience positive average prediction errors when they 
secure bank debt used to repay other debt suggests that the investment 
opportunity set hypothesis cannot fully explain the average positive 
prediction errors. This is because in these cases the funds are not 
used to develop or fund new investment projects.
Furthermore if announcements of bank debt send signals about 
future Investment opportunities, firm managers wishing to clarify this 
signal could state the purpose as future investment projects and/or 
capital expenditures. Yet only for the subsample of 26 WSJ 
announcements is the APE for announcements with capital expenditure as 
the stated purpose even weakly significantly different from zero. This 
average prediction error of 1.26% (z-1.68) is not significantly 
different from the APEs for the repay debt group or the general 
purpose/working capital group.
Another interesting result from the analysis of APEs grouped by 
purpose is the APE of 3.15% the unspecified acquisitions group. Though 
this average is not signifleantly different from zero, it is larger in 
magnitude than the average for any other group. This suggests that some 
bidder firm returns may occur well before the initiation of a specific 
acquis 11ion.
Results for samples further subdivided by firm size can be 
summarized as follows. No sample based on purpose for large firms 
generates a statistically significant APE, positive or negative. For
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small firms, all samples based on purpose generate statistically 
positive APEs with the exceptions of the "commercial paper backup" group 
which has only 1 observation, and the "capital expenditure" group which 
generates an APE of -0.33% (z--0.43) with 28 observations.
Event study results by type of lender
Not all "bank" debt agreements are with commerc ial banks in the 
legal sense of the term. Commercial banks are subject to certain 
regulations that many other firms are not. For example, the liabilities 
(deposits) of commercial banks are Insured. Since commercial banks must 
hold certain amounts of equity capital, their capital structures are 
largely fixed.
Given these differences, we consider event study results grouped 
by type of lender in Table 5-21. For the uncontaminated sample of 347 
agreements with commercial banks the APE is a significantly positive 
0.90% (z—3.92). The APE for the uncontaminated sample of 24 agreements 
with nonbanks is 0.77% (z-1.09), not statistically significant with 
58.3% of the prediction errors positive. The APEs are not statistically 
different as evidenced by a difference in means test t-0.046. Thus, we 
cannot conclude that it is only agreements with commercial banks, in the 
legal sense of the term, that generate positive responses.
Summary of event study results by agreement attributes
Event study results suggest that client firm shareholders benefit 
most from bank debt agreements structured as lines of credits. Samples 
of both revolving and straight lines of credit have statistically
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positive average two day prediction errors. Term loan agreements, 
similar to bonds in structure, do not generate significant share price 
responses. The sample of observations that did not report the agreement 
purpose have a significantly positive average prediction error. This 
suggests that it is not solely accompanying information regarding credit 
agreements that the capital market interprets as positive. Agreements 
obtained for the purposes of unspecified acquisitions and general 
purpose/working capital generate significantly positive market 
reactions. Bank credit agreements for capital expenditures and 
commercial paper backup, on average, generate normal returns. Average 
prediction errors do not appear to depend on collateral arrangements or 
type of lender.
Table 5-1: Average two-day p r e d ic t io n  errors  for f u l l  sanple  ( in c ludes  i n i t i a t i o n s / r e n e w a l s  and other  nevs-
- e . g .  d e f a u l t  announcements)
Full sample:
Nature of announcement: 
Reduce or cance l  bank debt  
I n i t i a t e  or renew bank debt 
Intend to  complete bank 
debt agreement 
Seeking a bank debt  
agreement  
Other news about bank debt


























Restructuring bank debt: 
R estructu r in g  announcements -0.63* -4 .  29 242 44 .6
Merger related announcements. 











Payment d e f a u l t s  
T echnica l  d e fa u l t s  
Ending d e f a u l t  
D efau lt  waivers  






-8 .  50 
-12.30  














Earnings announcements or f o r e c a s t s  -2.18*
Dividend announcements -2 .48 '
Separate  earnings  announcement











Table 5-1 (cont inued): Average two-day predic tion errors
__________________________________________IAFEfO.+n_______
Security  Related announcements:
Warrants to banks 0.73
Other s e c u r i t i e s  -0 .18
Repurchase s e c u r i t i e s  1.55“
General contaminated announcements:
Other news in sane announcement -1 .09“
Other announcement within event window -0.56'  
Previously announced announcements 0.27
Not found in WSJ -1 .41“
Retir ing bank debt: 1.38“
Source of announcement:
Wall Street Journal -0.85"*
Newswire -0 .75s
•Means t e s t  t  -  0.291
for fu l l  sample 
Z-stat________ N %positive
0.54 3 66.7
-1 .04  163 42.3
2.96 28 67.9
-4 .92  489 44.6
-1 .98 411 46.5
-0 .36 80 47.5
-3 .56 120 39.2
2.58 79 49.4
-6.32 1631 45.9
-2 .36 353 48.7
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Type of agreement: 
Revolving cred it  








































Restructuring bank debt; 
Restructuring announcements
Purpose of bank debt:
Not stated  
Repay debt
Unspecified acqu is i t ions  
Capital expenditures 
General purpose/Vorking cap i ta l  
Commercial paper support














































Table 5-2 (cont inued):  Average two-day p r e d i c t i o n  errors  for  contaminated and c le a n  i n i t i a t i o n s  or renewals
o f  bank debt
______________________________________________ %AFE(0.+1)_________ Z -s ta t___________ N ^ p o s i t iv e
Default  announcements:
Payment d e f a u l t s
Technical  d e f a u l t s 2.94 1 13 2 50.0
Ending d e f a u l t -2 .0 9 -1 . 11 11 36.4
D e fa u l t  waivers 5.35* 2 .06 8 75.0
Earnings/Dividend related announcements:
Earnings announcements or f o r e c a s t s -0 .6 1 -1 .  33 86 45.3
Dividend announcements 
Separate earn ings  announcement
-0 .6 3 - 0 .7 8 11 54.5
w i t h in  window 0.00 0.71 25 40 .0
S e c u r i t y  I s s u e  announcements:
Warrants to  banks 0 .80 0.62 2 50.0
Other s e c u r i t i e s -0 .2 5 - 0 .7 3 52 42.3
S e c u r i ty  repurchases -0 .0 3 -0 .1 8 14 57.1
General contaminated announcements:
Other news in  same announcement 0 .29 -0 .4 2 130 49.2
Other announcement w i th in  even t  window 0.38 1.03 179 52.5
P r e v io u s ly  announced announcements 1.12 0.75 38 44.7
N o n - in d u s t r ia l  companies - 1 .0 8 " -2 .92 48 43.8
R e t i r i n g  bank  debt: 2.03* 2.10 18 66.7
Renewal s t a t u s :
I n i t i a t i o n 1.54 0.52 566 48.2
Favorable renewal 1 .34“ 4.80 311 56.3
Less favorab le  terms than b e fore 1.90 1.24 8 62.5




Table 5-2 (continued): Average two-day prediction errors for contaminated and clean in i t i a t i o n s  or renewals
of bank debt
______________________________________ihfE(0.+lj_______ Z-stat N %positive
Source of announcement:
Wall Street  Journal 0.69**'’ 4.23 676 50,7
Wire only 0.20“ -0 ,75 214 51.9
■Means t e s t  t  -  1.88 
“Means t e s t  t  -  2.03
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Table 5-3: Descriptive statistics for firm and security specific
characteristics for 373 firms announcing bank debt Issues
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 01<z
Agreement amount 
($millions)
94. 38 30.00 1.00 4000.00 3 70
Agreement amount/ 
mkt. value of eq. . 8458 .4731 .0402 52 , 82 369
Mkt. value of eq. 
($mllllons)
252 . 19 63.51 1.86 5170.46 369
Maturi ty (vrs) 5 58 6 1 15 172
Long term debt/ 
mkt. value of eq. 1 .001 .4303 .0008 28 . 24 320
Insider hlgs (%) 17. 74 12 0. 5 62 147
Instit. hldgs (%) 19 .03 13.13 .042 66 . 72 298
# institutional 
investors 40.85 16 1 482 298
Relative bank 
debt .2248 .075 .0009 4 . 35 124
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Table 5-4: Descriptive statistics for firm and security specific





17 1 425 238
Agreement amount/ 
mkt. value of eq. 1.09 . 5908 .04838 52 . 82 238
Mkt. value of eq. 
($millions) 41. 57 34.21 1 .86 151.10 238
Maturity (yrs) 4.96 5 1 15 101
Long term debt/ 
mkt. value of eq. 1. 24 .6 304 .0008 28 .24 192
Insider hlgs (%) 21 . 21 17 1 60 55
Tnstitut. hldgs (%) 1178 8.77 .0418 66 . 72 1 74
# institutions 12. 52 8 1 192 11
Relative bank 




100 10 4000 132
Agreement amount/ 
mkt. value of eq. .4044 . 3146 .0402 2 .42 11
Mkt. value of eq. 
($millions) 634.8 333.07 84 , 24 5170.46 131
Maturity (yrs) 6.45 7 1 15 71
Long term debt/ 
mkt. value of eq. .6356 . 2997 .0023 7 . 817 128
Insider hlgs (%) 15 . 67 8 0. 5 66 . 5 92
Institut. hldgs (%) 29.21 29.90 . 387 66 . 5 124
# institutions 80.60 54 1 482 124
Rel, bank debt . 1595 .0397 .0008 2 . 25 61
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Table 5-5: Two day average prediction errors grouped by source of
announcement and firm size
Grouo %APE(0.+1) Z-stat N * Positive
All observat ions:
Smal1 firms:
Wall Street Journal -1.12“ -6. 72 930 45 .8
Newswire -0.95“ -2 . 83 283 50. 9
Large firms:
Wall Street Journal -0. 39 -1.90 701 45.9
Newswire 0. 10 0.42 71 40.8
Initiations and Renewals:
Small firms;
Wall Street Journal 1.17" 5.01 343 51. 3
Newswire 0.45 -0.13 174 57 . 5
Large firms:
Wall Street Journal 0.21 0. 95 333 50. 2
Newswire -0.85 -1 .40 41 29. 3
Clean Initiations and Renewals.
Wall Street Journal 1 25“* 4 . 93 277 54 . 2
Newswire -0. 18* -0. 35 96 53.1
Small firms:
Wall Street Journal 1. 87**'’ 5.22 158 55. 7
Newswire 0.02b 0.41 82 59. 8
Large firms;
Wall Street Journal 0.43c 1. 52 119 52 . 1
Newswlre -1. 36c -1.90 14 14. 3
•Means test t — 2.276 
Heans test t - 2.065 
“Means test t - 2.204
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Table 5-6: Two day average prediction errors for clean sample of bank
debt announcements grouped by previous share price runup and firm size
Group %APEfC.+l) Z-stat N % Positive
All firms:
Negative share 
price runup 2 .40“ 3 .40 29 58 . 6
Other firms 0.75“ 3 .26 344 53 . 5
Snia 11 f i rms :
Negative share 
price runup 2. 66“ 2.85 18 55. 6
Other firms 1. 12“ 3 .84 222 57. 2
Large firms:
Negative share 
price runup 1. 97 1.88 11 63.6
Other firms 0.08 0. 29 122 46 . 7
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Table 5-7: Two day average prediction errors for clean bank
announcements grouped by monitoring variables
Grouc %APE(0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
By firm size:
Small firms 1. 24”* 4.47 240 57. 1
Large firms 0. 24* 0.82 133 48 .1
By dividend history:
Paid recent dividend 0.47“ 1.47 137 53.3
Not paid dividend 1.13“* 4 .04 235 54. 5
By auditor quality:
Big-Eight auditor 0,91“* 3.78 315 53.0
Non-Big-Eight auditor 0.61' 1.04 51 58 . 8
Unknown auditor 1. 36 1.60 7 57 . 1
By institutional holdings:
< median Inst, hldgs 1. 23““ 3 .44 151 55. 6
> median inst hldgs 0 0?d 0, 33 151 49. 7
Unknown inst. hldgs 1.99" 3.83 71 59. 2
By Insider holdings:
< med. Insider hldgs 0.81' 2 .05 72 58. 3
> med. insider hldgs -0.03* -0.48 75 53. 3
Unknown insider hldg 1.27" 4. 52 226 53.2
By number of institutional holders:
< med. # inst. hldrs 1. 38^ 3 .94 155 59.4
> med. # inst. hldrs -0.18f -0.22 147 45. 6
Unknown # inst. hldrs 1.99“ 3.83 71 59. 2
By leverage;
< med. leverage 














By existing bank debt: 
< med. bank debt 0.81* 1.80 62 54 . 8
> med. bank debt 0. 54* 0.77 62 51 . 6
Unknown bank debt 0. 98" 3 . 71 249 54. 2
•Means test t - 1.631
‘Means test t - 1.031
Means test t - 0.356
“Means test t — 1.988
•Means test t — 1.561
*Means test t — 2.631
■Means test t — 0.552
Means test t - 0,611
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Table 5-8: Two day average prediction errors for clean bank
announcements grouped by firm size and monitoring variables
Group %APE10,+1) Z-stat N % Positive
By institutional holdings: 
Sma11 firms:
< median Inst, hldgs 1. 37"* 3. 62 117 56 .4
> median Inst. hldgs 0.04* -0.02 59 52 . 5
Unknown Inst. hldgs 2 .09“ 3 . 79 64 62 . 5
Large firms:
< median Inst. hldgs 0. 73b 0. 56 34 52 . 9
> median Inst. hldgs -0.00‘ 0.43 92 47 . 8
Unknown Inst, hldgs 0.9 9 0. 78 7 28.6
By number of institut ional 
Sma11 firms:
< raed. # inst. hldrs
holders: 
1.29"* 3 .46 134 58 . 2
> med. # inst. hldrs -0.24* -0.17 42 45 . 2
Unknown # inst . hldrs 2 .09" 3. 79 64 62 . 5
Large firms:
< med. # inst. hldrs 1.94" 1 . 96 21 66 . 7
> med. # ins t, hldrs -0.15d -0. 15 105 45 . 7
Unknown # inst . hldrs 0.99 0. 76 7 28 . 5
By insider holdings:
Small firms:
< med. # insld hlgs 2 .07' 1 . 77 14 71.4
> med. # insld hlgs 0. 59* 0.87 41 63 .4
Unknown # insid hlgs 1.36“ 4.31 183 55.2
Large firms:
< med. # ins id hlgs 0. 53f 1. 33 41 53.7
> med. # insld hlgs -0. 37f -1.04 51 47 . 1
Unknown # Insid hlgs 0. 88 1.44 39 43.6
By dividend history:
Small firms:
Paid recent dividend 0.45* 0. 70 42 52.4
Not paid dividend 1.41“* 4. 60 198 58 .1
Large firms:
Paid recent dividend C. 30* 1.10 89 51. 7
Not paid dividend 1.08" -0.14 44 40. 9
•Means test t - 1.842 'Means test t - 0.893
•Means test t — 0.236 Means test t — 1.620
‘Means test t - 1.604 ■Means test t - 0.971
'‘Means test t — 1.762 ‘Means test t — 0.706
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Table 5-8 Cont’d: Two day average prediction errors for clean bank 
announcenents grouped by firm size and monitoring variables
Grouo %APEf0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
By auditor quality:
Small firms:
Big-Eight auditor 1. 37“* 4 .19 188 56 .4
Non-Big-Eight auditor 0. 59* 1 .03 47 57.4
Unknown auditor 2 ,42* 2.13 5 80.0
Large firms:
Big-Eight auditor 0.24fc 0.85 127 48.0
Non-Big-Eight auditor 0.84h 0.19 4 75.0
Unknown auditor -1. 31 -0.37 2 0.0
By leverage:
Small firms:
< med. leverage 1. 26** 2 . 19 81 54 . 3
> med. leverage 1.87"1 4.28 113 60. 2
Unknown leverage -0. 36 0.60 46 54. 3
Large firms:
< med. leverage 0. 38* 1.19 80 52. 5
> med. leverage 0.12* -0.01 50 44.0
Unknown leverage -0.02 -0.63 3 0.0
By existing bank debt;
Sma11 f irms
< med. bank debt 0.57* 0. 30 22 50.0
> med. bank debt 1.37* 1. 96 41 58 . 5
Unknown bank debt 1.29* 4.15 177 57 .6
Large fi rms:
< med. bank debt 0.94*f 2.02 40 57 . 5
> med. bank debt -1.08' -1.42 21 38 .1
Unknown bank debt 0.23 0. 37 72 45 . 8
Means test t — 0.717 
"Means test t — 0.036 
Means test t — 0.786 
Cleans test t - 0.700 
Means test t — 0.727 
Means test t — 2.114
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Table 5-9: Two day average prediction errors grouped by renewal status
Group __ . %APEfO.+n Z-stat N I Positive
A: Agreement with new benk is a renewal (My criterion)
A.l: Full clean sample
Initiation 0.35* 1.39 207 50. 7
Favorable
Renewal 1.64— 4.75 162 58.6
Unfavorable
Renewal -4.20 -1.19 2 0.0
Reduct ion -0.36 -0. 12 2 50.0
A.2 : Clean WSJ sample
Initiation 0.79* 2.33 139 50.4
Favorable
Renewal 1.84" 4.88 134 60.0
Unfavorable
Renewal -4.20 -1.19 2 0.0
Reduction -0. 36 -0.12 2 50.0
B : Agreement with new bank is new agreement (LM cri terion)
B . 1: Full Clean Sample








Initiation 1.09“ 3.08 149 53.0
Favorable renewal 1. 55“ 4.16 124 56 .5
‘Means test t — 2.132 ‘Means test t - 1.492
Table 5-10: Two day average prediction errors grouped bv renewal status
and firm size— full clean sample
roue lAPEiO. tb Z-s tat N * Positive
Agreement with new bank is a renewal (My 
Small firms:
criterion)
Initiation 0 .43* 1.44 143 53 . 1
Favorable 
Renewal 2 . 52~* 5.47 95 64 . 2
Unfavorable
Renewal -3 . 10 -1.05 1 0.0
Reduction -0. 79 -0.20 
Large firms:
I 0.0
Initiation 0.17 0. 36 64 45 . 3
Favorable
Renewal 0. 39 0.87 67 50. 7
Unfavorable
Renewal -5.31 -0.63 1 0.0
Reduction 0.08 0.03 1 100.0
Agreement with new bank is a new agreement 
Small firms:
(LM criterion)
Initiation 0. 75** 2 .22 156 55. 8
Favorable
Renewal 2.25“* 4.73 
Large firms:
82 61.0
Initiation 0. 17 0. 36 64 45 . 3
Favorable
Renewal 0 . 39 0.87 67 50. 7
'Means test t - 2.539 'Means test t - 1.912
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Table 5-11: Two day average prediction errors grouped by renewal status
and firm size— clean WSJ sample
GrouD %APE(0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
Agreement with new bank is a renewal (my criterion)
Sma11 f Lrms:
Initiation 1.05* 2.21 85 50. 6
Favorable
Renewal 2 .96" 5. 52 
Large firms:
71 63.4
Init iation 0.37 0.97 54 4 5.0
Favorable
Renewal 0. 57 1. 26 63 54.0
Agreement witb new bank is a new agreement (LM criterion)
Small firms:
Initiation 1. 50“ 3.13 95 54. 7
Favorable
Renewal 2 . 58“ 4.65 
Large firms:
61 59.0
Initiation 0. 37 0.97 54 50.0
Favorable
Renewal 0. 57 1.26 63 54 .0
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Table 5-12: Two day average prediction errors grouped by prior bank
debt
Grouo %APEf0. +1) Z - s t a t N % P o s i t i v e
Full Clean samp 1e:
No prior ST 
bank debt -0, 12 -0.00 75 45 . 3
Existing ST 
borrowings1 0.86* 2.21 100 56 .0
Expans ion 1.49" 3 .82 141 59 .6
ExtensIon 3.45“ 2 . 79 12 41. 7
More favorable 
rms 1 . 58 1 . 80 9 66 . 7
Less favorable 
terms -4.20 -1.19 2 0 . 0
"Bank loans"3 -0 . 36 -0.24 6 83.3
Open lines5 -0.10 -0.2 7 26 38. 5





42 47 . 6
Existing ST 
borrowings' 0.81* 2.13 72 50.0
Expansion 1.59“ 3.68 116 58 .6
Extension 5. 26“ 3.81 9 55.6
More favorable 
terms 1. 58 1. 80 9 66. 7
Less favorable 
terms -4.20 -1. 19 2 0 . 0
"Bank loans"1 -0. 36 -0. 24 6 83.3
Open lines1 0 . 69 . 68 19 47 .4
'As evidenced by notes payable under a bank credit agreement In Moody * s. 
3A s evidenced by "bank loans" on balance sheet in Moodv * s . JAs evidenced 
by discussion of credit facilities in Moodv * s.
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Table 5-13: Two day average prediction errors grouped by prior bank
debt and firm size
Croup %APEfO.+ll Z-stat N % Positive
No prior ST 
bank debt \ O
Sma11 Firms:
.03 62 45. 2
Existing ST 
borrowings1 1.11* 2 .22 68 61.8
Expans ion 2 .05” 3 .83 83 62. 7
Extension 6 . 54" 4.31 8 62 . 5
More favorable 
terms 4.37" 3.12 4 100.0
Less favorable 
terms -3 .10 -1.05 1 0.0
"Bank loans"1 0. 52 0. 19 2 100.0
Open lines3 -0.00 -0.4 7 11 36 .4
No prior ST 
bank debt 0.09
Large Firms 
-.06 13 46. 2
Existing ST 
borrowings' 0. 33 .67 32 43. 8
Expansion . 69 1. 38 58 55.2
Extension 2. 74 -1. 25 4 0.0
More favorable 
terms .65 -.37 4 40.0
Less favorable 
terms -5. 31 -.63 1 0.0
"Bank loans"2 -0.80 -0. 44 4 75. 0
Open lines3 0, 15 .04 15 40.00
'Â  evidenced by notes payable under a bank credit agreement in Moody ’ s . 
2As evidenced by "bank loans" on balance sheet in Moodv’s . 3As evidenced 
by discussion of credit facilities in Moodv1s.
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Table 5-14: Two day average prediction errors grouped by nature of
relationship
Grouo %APE(0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
A: Full clean samp1e
All clean: 
Same bank 2.05" 2 . 88 41 56. 1
Changed banks 2.67' 2.21 18 72 . 2
Unknown 0. 63“ 2 . 87 313 52 .4
Dollar expansions: 
Same bank 1. 70“ 2 .60 28 53.6
Changed banks 3. 79“ 2 .66 14 78 .6
B: Clean WSJ sample
All clean: 
Same bank 3 ,04“ 3 . 36 21 57 . 1
Changed banks 00 1 3.01 12 83 . 3
Unknown 0.94” 3 . 60 244 52 . 5
Dollar expansions: 
Same bank 1. 70“ 2 . 60 28 53 . 6
Changed banks 3. 79“ 2 .66 14 78 .6
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Table 5-15: Two day average prediction errors grouped by exchange
listing status
Group %APEfO.+l> Z-stat N % Positive
NYSE/AMEX
NASDAQ
A: Full clean sample 
0.67' 2.44 236 
1.26“ 3.52 137











A. 2.Large firms 
0.08 0.53 113 
1.14 0.85 20




B: Clean WSJ sample 
0.85"* 2.97 203 
2.36“* 4.63 74




B .1 .Sma11 Firms:
1.39“ 2.89 103 










*Means test t — 1.85
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Table 5-16: Two 
agreement
day average prediction errors grouped by type of
GroUD %APEfO.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
A: Full clean samp1e
Revolving
credit 0.98* 2 . 39 123 52.8
Straight line 
of credit 1. 57“ 3.65 84 57 . 1
Term loan 0. 14 -0.11 7 42 . 9
Combination* 0. 54 1 .49 115 53.0
Other* 0.28 0.42 43 53 . 5
B : WSJ c1 eon sample
Revolving
credit 1. 37“ 3 .03 98 55 . 1
Straight line 
of credit 2 . 89“ 4 . 74 54 59 . 3
Term loan 0. 14 -0.22 5 40.0
Combination* 0.45 1.52 90 52 . 2
Other* 0.48 0.62 30 50.0
*A combination agreement is defined as one in which a term loan is 
combined with a revolving or straight line of credit. The term loan may 
be a conversion of a line of credit at a future date. The "other" 
category includes agreements identified with as "credit agreements," 
"loan agreements," or "credit facilities."
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Table 5-17: Two day average prediction errors grouped by type of
agreement and firm size
Croup %APE(0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
A : Sma11 f i rms
Revolving
credit 1.17 1. 55 59 49 .2
Straight line 
of credit 3 . 55" 4 . 63 40 62 . 5
Term loan 1.45 0. 59 2 50.0
Combination* 1.48" 2 . 59 37 56. 8
Other* 1. 34 1. 74 20 60.0
B : Large firms
Revolving
credi t 1.68" 2.89 39 64. 1
Straight 1ine 
of credit 0.99 1.48 14 50. 0
Term loan r*O1piOt 3 33. 3
Combination* -0.26 -0.19 53 49. 1
Other* -1.24 -1.39 10 30.0
*A combination agreement is defined as one in which a term loan is 
combined with a revolving or straight line of credit. The tern loan may 
be a conversion of a line of credit at a future date. The "other" 
category includes agreements identified with as "credit agreements," 




Two day average 
arrangement
prediction errors grouped by nature of
Group %APE(0 »+l) Z-stat N % Positive
A: Fu 11 clean sample
Secured 1. 54' 2 .08 43 48. 8
Unsecured 0.82 1.16 57 59. 6
Unknown 0.79“ 3 .40 272 53. 3
B: Clean WSJ sajnpJe
Secured 2 .62" 2.91 29 48. 3
Unsecured 0.55 0. 59 46 52 . 2
Unknown 1. 21“ 4.39 202 55.4
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Table 5-19: Two day average prediction errors grouped by stated
purpose*
Grouo %AP£(0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
A: Full c1ean samp 1e
Not stated 0. 74* 2 .16 150 53 . 3
All specific
purposes together 0 . 98** 3 . 50 223 54 . 3
Specific purposes:
Repay debt 1. 16 1. 92 48 52. 1
Unspec i fled 
acquisitions 3 .15 1. 56 10 60.0
Capital exp. 0. 28 0.43 43 58 . 1
Gen purpose/ 
working cap 1 . 04~ 3 . 05 117 53 . 8
Commerc ial 
paper support 1 o LP -0.99 4 25.0
B: Clean WSJ sample
Not stated 0 . 96* 2 .41 115 53.0
Repay debt 1.71* 2 .20 36 55.6
Unspecified
acquisitions 2.81 1. 19 9 55.6
Capital exp. 1.26 1. 68 26 57 . 7
Gen purpose/ 
working cap 1 . 31** 3 . 31 88 54 . 5
Conmie re i a 1 
paper support 0.14 oo1 3 33 . 3
*lf multiple purposes are stated and one was not obviously prominent, 
the first purpose was used In classifications.
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Table 5-20: Two day average prediction errors grouped by stated
purpose* and firm size





3 .03 94 57.4
All specific
purposes together 1.21" 3 . 30 146 56 .8
Specific purposes: 
Repay debt 1. 56* 2.12 37 59 . 5
llnspeci f led 
acquisi tions 4. 37* 2. 14 8 75 . 0
Capital exp. -0.33 -0.43 28 57 .1
Gen purpose/ 
working cap 1 . 31" 2 .82 72 54. 2
Commercial 





-0.40 56 46 .4
All specific
purposes togethe r 0.53 1.42 77 49 .4
Specific purposes; 
Repay debt -0.19 0.12 11 27 . 3
Unspecified
acquisitions -1. 73 -0.80 2 0.0
Capital exp. 1.41 1.32 15 60.0
Gen purpose/ 
working cap 0.60 1.37 46 54. 3
Commercial 
paper support 00o1 or̂O1 3 33. 3
*If multiple purposes are stated and one was not obviously prominent, 
the first purpose was used in classifications.
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Table 5-21: Two day average prediction errors grouped by type of lender
Grouo %APEtO.+ll Z-stat N % Positive
A: Full clean sample
Commercial
Bank 0.90" 3.92 347 53. 3
Traditional
Nonbank* 0.7 7 1.09 24 58 . 3
NonfInane ial
company O o o 1 100 .0
B : Clean WSJ sample
Commercial
Bank 1.26" 4 .88 268 54. 5
Traditional
Nonbank 0.98 0.72 9 44.4
'Includes commercial finance companies such as General Electric Credit, 
insurance companies, and savings and loan associations.
Chapter 6: Bank Debt Announcement Regression Results
Weighted multivariate least squares regressions are employed to 
further test hypotheses. Event study results reported in the previous 
Chapter consider only univariate or bivariate classifications. Since 
some factors may proxy for others, we employ multivariate regression 
methodology to consider the importance of security and firm specific 
factors holding other factors constant.
Regression results that follow are from least squares regressions 
weighted by the respective inverses of standard forecast errors for two 
dav prediction errors Dependent variables in each regression are two-
day prediction errors. For regressions containing only qualitative 
independent variables, standardized two-day prediction errors (SCPE) are 
regressed on unstandardized dummy variables. The remainder of the 
Chapter Includes a discussion of regression results, followed by a 
summary of key results.
A . Discussion
Presented in Table 6-1 are regression results for the full clean 
sample. They provide additional support for the firm size hypothesis. 
The natural log of firm size is used because firm size values have 
outliers and the relationship could be argued to be nonlinear. Equation 
1 of Table 6-1 shows the coefficient of ln(firm size) is -.0049 
(t— 3.10), statistically significant at the .01 level. The intercept is 
also statistically significant, a positive .0595 (t-3.25). Given
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previous findings of the Importance of renewals In this study and 
others, a dummy for renewals (equals unity) is included to analyze the 
importance of renewal status holding firm size constant. It has a 
coefficient of .0103 (t—2.02), statistically significant at the .05 
level. Thus, for the full clean sample of bank debt announcements, 
regression results support the previous findings of the importance of 
firm size and renewal status in the market's Interpretation of bank 
debt. Share price response is negatively related to the natural log of 
firm size. Renewal status is an important determinant holding firm size 
constant.
Disaggregating the sample into small and large firms (Tables 6-2 
and 6-3) reveals that statistical significance obtains only for small 
firms. Within the small firm sample, firm size is an important 
determinant of market reactions to bank debt announcements. The 
coefficient of ln(firm size) for small firms is -.0115 (t— 2,96), 
statistically significant at a .01 level; the corresponding coefficient 
for large firms is .0008 (t-0.26), not statistically significant. Firm 
size is unimportant In the market's Interpretation of bank debt 
announcements for large firms. Moreover, the intercept for the large 
firm sample is a statistically insignificant -.0095 (t--0.23). The 
small firm sample has a statistically positive Intercept of .1239 
(t-3.07).
The renewal dummies display similar patterns--statistically 
significant only for small firms. The coefficient for the renewal dummy 
for large firms is .0020 (t—0.34), not statistically significant; the
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corresponding coefficient for the small firm tenewal dummy is a 
statistically signifleant .0188 (t—2.49).
Equation (2) adds a dummy equal to one for firms with 
statistically negative (at a .10 level) share price runups for days -30 
to -11. For many small firms, coverage by the financial press is 
sparse. Thus, this dummy is employed to capture possible capital market 
concern about a firm’s financial health. Moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems are more severe for these firms suggesting that bank 
monitoring may be relatively more valuable. For the full sample, the 
coefficient of this dummy is .0165 (t—1.76), statistically significant 
at the .10 level. The small firm sample dummy coefficient is a positive 
.0199 (t-1.45), but not statistically significant. The large firm 
sample also has a positive, but insignificant, coefficient for this 
dummy, .0178 (t—1.63). Inclusion of this dummy does not change other 
regression coefficients significantly.
Addition of tnoni taring and control variables
Equation (3) adds monitoring and control variables to the 
regression equations. The adjusted R1 rises for the full clean sample 
from .0351 to .0530 indicating additional explanatory power provided by 
monitoring and control variables. The firm size result is robust to 
Inclusion of other firm and security-specific variables. The 
coefficient of firm size for the full clean sample is -.0051 (t— 2.29), 
statistically significant at the ,05 level. The coefficient of firm 
size for the small firm sample is also robust: -.0112 (t— 2.41). For
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large firms, Insignificance of the firm size coefficient remains: -.0004 
(t— 0.10).
The coefficient of the renewal dummy retains significance in the 
full sample, .0099 (t-1.89), and the small firm sample, .0172 (t-2.21). 
The coefficient remains statistically zero for the large firm sample.
The intercept coefficients remain statistically positive for both the 
full clean and small firm samples, and insignificant for large firms.
The coefficient of the relative size of the agreement is 
statistically positive: ,0039 (t — 2.07). There are three possible 
interpretations of this result. First, the relative size of the 
agreement is measured as dollar of agreement divided by market value of 
equity. For agreements that do not repay other debt, this measure is 
equivalent to the change in leverage of the firm if leverage is defined 
as debt to equity. This interpretation is consistent with findings of 
positive relationships between announcement effects of securities 
issuance and direction of leverage change, but inconsistent with Eckbo 
(1986) and Dann and Mikkelson (1984) who find nonpositive announcement 
effects for debt issues.
A second interpretation is developed by Wansley, Elayan, and 
Collins (1991) who argue that a larger relative size indicates larger 
investment opportunity sets, thus causing larger revaluations. A third 
interpretation is that monitoring intensity Increases with relative 
size. Higher monitoring intensity generates greater benefits for 
shareholders causing a larger share price response.
The coefficient of natural log of insider holdings is negative and 
significant at the .10 level. Percentage of insider holdings is
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expressed as a number between 1.0% and 99% so that natural log of 
Insider holdings Is positive. This result is as hypothesized and
suggests that firms with larger insider holdings benefit less from 
additional bank monitoring because agency problems are less severe for 
these firms.
The coefficient of the dummy equal to one for firms with available 
data for leverage is a positive .0207 (t—2.12) and statistically 
significant. The coefficient of the dummy equal to one for firms whose 
auditor is known is negative -.0367 (t—1.65) and statistically 
significant at the .10 level.
All other regression coefficients are not statistically different 
from zero. The sign is negative on the coefficient for relative bank 
debt, but the t is only -0,66. The coefficient of natural log of 
maturity is negative, but not statistically significant. Thus, within 
the sample of bank debt agreements, maturity does not appear to be an 
important determinant of market reaction to bank debt announcements. 
Flannery’s maturity hypothesis is not supported by the data.
The signs are opposite from expected on the dummy equal to unity 
for firms that paid a recent dividend and the dummy equal to unity for 
firms with Big-Eight auditors.
Regression results for small firms are qualitatively similar to 
the full sample. The dummy for known auditor is no longer significant, 
while the sign on relative bank debt has reversed to positive. The 
three coefficients significant in equations (1) and (2) remain 
significant with the addition of monitoring and control variables. 
Relative size is only weakly significant for small firms.
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For large firms, only one coefficient (relative existing bank 
debt) is significantly different from zero. Moreover, the F-statlstic 
and R3 are both quite small. Consistent with predictions, the 
coefficient of relative bank debt is -.0475 (t— 2.41), statistically 
significant at the .05 level. Large firms with relatively higher levels 
of bank debt benefit less from additional bank monitoring because they 
are currently well monitored. It is noteworthy that a similar result 
obtains for bond announcements, typically made by large firms, Slgns 
are opposite from predicted on the Big-Eight auditor dummy and the 
recent dividend dummy, but not statistically significant.
Equation (4) adds two variables for institutional holdings to 
regression equation (3): natural log of institutional holdings and a
dummy equal to unity for firms with institutional holdings information 
available. These are added in a separate regress Ion because 
institutional holdings is related to firm size and creates a 
multlcolltnearity problem.
With the Inclusion of institutional holdings, the coefficient of 
firm size falls to -.0040 (t-1.73) for the full clean sample and is 
significant only at the .10 level. The coefficlent of insider holdings 
loses slgnificance, as well as the dummy for known auditor and the 
intercept. The coefficient of institutional holdings is negative as 
predicted, but not statistically significant. Similarly, for small 
firms, the coefficient of firm size falls from -.0112 to -.0094, 
statistically significant only at the .10 level. The significance of 
other coefficients is unaffected by the addition of institutional 
holdings.
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For large firms, relative bank debt remains a significant 
determinant of share price responses to bank debt announcements with a 
coefficient of -.0496 (t— 2.51), Additionally, a dummy equal to one for 
nonzero Compustat bank debt is significantly positive at the .10 level. 
The F-statistic (0.986) and adjusted R3 (-.0022), however, remain low.
B . Summary
Regression results for bank debt agreements indicate that firm 
size and renewal status are important determinants of capital market 
responses to bank debt announcements. Statistical significance of these 
variables obtains for the full clean sample. Dichotimizing the sample 
by firm size, however, reveals that statistical significance obtains 
only for small firms. Within the small firm sample, firm size and 
renewal status are important determinants of share price response to 
bank debt announcements. Coefficients of these variables in the large 
firm regression are statistically zero. These results provide 
additional support for the developed hypotheses regarding firm size and 
its impact on bank loans as signals of firm value.
Lumraer and McConnell’s (1989) finding of the importance of renewal 
status is confirmed. A dummy equal to unity for renewals is 
significantly positive in the full sample, but disaggregating by firm 
size reveals that renewal status is Important only for small firms.
Thus, small firms benefit from the periodic review and monitoring that 
short term bank borrowing entails; large firms do not.
With the exception of relative existing bank debt, no other 
coefficients of monitoring variables obtain statistical significance in
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either the full sample or the samples dichotimlzed by firm size. The 
coefficient of relative existing bank debt is statistically negative for 
large firms. Two control variables, relative size of agreement and a 
dummy equal to unity if leverage is known, obtain statistical 
significance in the full sample regression. But again, dlchotimizing by 
firm size reveals that significance obtains only for small firms.
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Table 6-1: Weighted LS regressions of clean sample of 373 bank debt
announcement two-day prediction errors on various monitoring and control 
variables._________________________________________________________________
Eauation (11 (2) (4)
Intercept .0595“ .0576" .0643* .0525
(3.25) (3.15) (2.08) (164)
ln(firm size) -.0049" -.0048" - .0051’ -.0040
(-3.10) (-3.07) (-2.29) (-1.73)
Renewal dummy .0103* .0102* .0092 .0099
(2.02) (2.01) (1.77) (1.89)
D i slrcss dummy .0165 .0185' .0168
(1.76) (1 96) (1.77)




Known if secured -.0003 -.0003
(-0.05) (-0.05)
Secured . 0046 .0044
(0.42) (0.39)
Type agreement known . 0086 .0080
(1.05) (0.97)
Term loan -.0063 -.0046
(-0.39) (-0.29)
Relative size .0039’ .0038’
(2.07) (2.01)
Insider hldgs known .004 5 .0067
(0.46) (0.66)




Leverage known .0207' .0274*
(2.12) (2.55)
Recent dividend .0035 .004 2
(0.54) (.64)
Big-eight auditor .0045 .0057
(0.54) (0.68)
Aud i t o r known -.0347 -.0291
(-1.65) (-137)
Relative bank debt -.0080 -.0079
(-0.64) (-0.64)
Bank debt known .0007 .0005
(0.13) (0.09)
Institutional hldgs known -.0122
(-1-23)
ln(% Institutional hldgs) -.0018
(-0.73)
Adjusted RJ ,0297 .0351 .0530 .0565
F 6.66" 5 .49" 2 .09" 2 .05"
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Table 6-2: Weighted LS regressions of 239 clean small firm bank debt
announcement two-day prediction errors on various monitoring and control
v a r i a b l e s . ___________________________________________________________________________
Equation_________________ LL>__________ L21_____________ O l___________ L4J_____
Intercept . 1239“ .1221“ . 1254* .1076*
(3.07) (3.03) (2.38) (199)
ln(firmslze) -.0115“ -.0115" -.0112* -. 0094*
(-2.96) (-2.97) (-2.41) (-196)
Renewal dummy .0188* .0198" .0172* .0178*
(2.49) (2.61) (2.21) (2.28)
Distress dummy .0199 .0211 .0186
(1.45) (1-45) (1.27)








Type agreement known .0040 .0027
(0.33) (0.22)
Term loan -.0116 -.0073
(-0.39) (-.24)
Relative size .0039 .0039
(1.67) (166)
Insider hldgs known .0141 .0186
(0.66) (0.86)




Leverage known .0244* .0305*
(2.11) (2.40)
Recent dividend -.0020 -.0012
(-0.20) (-0.12)
Big-eight auditor .0062 .0078
(0.62) (0.78)
Auditor known -.0364 -.0326
(-1.35) (-1.20)
Relative bank debt .0100 ,0113
(0.61) (0.69)
Bank debt known -.0085 -.0092
(-0.87) (0.93)
Institutional hldgs known -.0110
(-0.89)
ln(% institutional hldgs) -.0024
(-0.74)
Adjusted R1 .0507 .0550 .0527 .0535
F 7.35“ 5.62“ 1.70" 1.64“
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Table 6-3: Weighted LS regressions of 132 clean large firm bank debt
announcement two-day prediction errors on various monitoring and control
variables.________________________________________________________________
Equation______________ QJ_________L2J___________ OJ1___________UlI____
Intercept -.0095 -.0135 -.0183 -.0423
(-0.23) (-0.33) (-0.29) (-0.65)
In(firm size) . 0008 .0011 -.0004 .0011
(0.26) (0.34) (-0.10) (0.28)
Renewal dummy .0020 .0008 .0018 .0029
(0.34) (0.14) (0.27) (0.43)
Distress dummy .0178 .0192 .0193
(1.63) (1-64) (164)








Type agreement known .0131 .0135
(123) (1-27)
Term loan -.0062 -.006 7
(-0.37) (-0.41)
Relative size -.0028 -.0017
(-0.31) (-0.19)
Insider hldgs known -.0037 -.0010
(-0.38) (-0.11)




Leverage known .0339 .0292
(0.88) (0.76)
Recent dividend .0053 .0077
(0.64) (0.91)
Big-eight auditor .0086 .0099
(0.38) (0.43)
Aud i to r known -.0261 -.0079
(-0.50) (-0.14)
Relative bank debt - .0475* -0.0496*
(-2.41) (-2.51)
Bank debt known .0107 .0111
(1.63) (1.68)
Institutional hldgs known -.0009
(-0.05)
ln(% institutional hldgs) -.0046
(-1.25)
Adjusted R1 -.0143 -.0015 -.0029 -.0022
F 0.08 0.94 0.98 0.986
Chapter 7: Bond Announcement Empirical Results
A summary of results for bond announcements is presented first 
followed by a more detailed discussion. Empirical results for the bond 
announcement sample are broadly consistent with previous studies. The 
full uncontaminated sample has an insignificant two day average 
prediction error. Disaggregating by firm size does not change the 
results appreciably. Both small and large firm samples have 
Insignificant average prediction errors. The APE for small firms is 
slightly higher than, but not statistically different from, the APE for 
large firms. Thus, there is no firm size effect within the bond sample. 
Bond announcement prediction errors display cross-sectional patterns 
different from that of bank debt announcements. This suggests that the 
capital market is able to distinguish between the two and regards bank 
debt as providing valuable assets services for small firms.
Event study results suggest that the relative amount of existing 
bank debt of a firm is a significant determinant of share price response 
to bond announcements. Firms with above median relative bank debt have 
a statistically negative average two day prediction error. In contrast, 
below median bank debt firms have a positive (at the .10 level) average 
prediction error. Moreover, the APEs across the samples are 
statistically different at the .01 level.
Cross-sectional regression results Indicate that share price 
responses to bond announcements are negatively related to relative 
existing bank debt, a dummy equal to unity for firms that paid recent
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dividends, and the natural log of institutional holdings. The relative 
bank debt result is consistent with event study results. Regressions 
also reveal that sinking fund provisions are important; the coefficient 
of the sinking fund dummy variable is positive.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Descriptive 
statistics are presented in Part A for the uncontaminated bond sample 
followed by comparisons of firm attributes across bond and bank debt 
samples. Presented in Part B of this Chapter are event study results 
ior contaminated and uncontara i na ted bond samples disaggregated by 
security characteristics and firm characteristics. Part C contains a 
discussion of regression results.
A. Descript ive statistics for uncontaminated bond announcements
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7-1 for firms 
issuing bonds. Firms issuing bonds are relatively larger firms as 
evidenced by a median firm size of $445.54 million, with a range of 
$4.29 million to $36,730 million. The median amount of new financing 
relative to market value of equity is .1602, ranging from .0137 to 3.95. 
Bonds have longer maturities than most bank debt, a median maturity of 
20 years Median insider holdings is 4%; median institutional holdings 
is 25.83 %. Median number of institutional investors is 89, ranging 
from 1 to 895. Firms that issue bonds use relatively smaller amounts of 
bank debt; median value is .0366, comparable to the median for large 
firms obtaining bank debt. Median long term leverage of firms that 
issue bonds is comparable to those that obtain bank debt: .4903.
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B Differences in firm attributes between bond and bank debt samples
We compare descriptive statistics for firms across the two samples 
to Investigate attributes of firms choosing public and private market 
financing. As expected, the data suggests that smaller firms cannot tap 
public debt markets as easily as larger firms with less severe 
asymmetric information problems. Median market value of equity for 
firms announcing bank debt is $63,510 million; for firms announcing bond 
Issues, median firm size is approximately seven times larger, $445,540 
mi 11 ion. Median firm size for large firms announcing bank debt is 
$333.07 million, closer to but still less than the median for bond 
announcements.
Other descriptive measures correlated with firm size show similar 
differences across bond and bank debt samples. Median insider holdings 
for bank debt firms is 12.0%, and for bond debt firms 4.0%. Median 
institutional holdings is 13.13% for bank debt firms, and 25.83% for 
bond debt firms. Bank debt firms have a median number of Institutional 
investors of 16 while bond debt firms’ median is 89.
These differences are consistent with arguments put forth by Fama 
and Diamond that suggest greater asymmetric problems for smal1 firms 
make debt financing relatively more expensive, apparently prohibitively 
expensive. Small firms represent 21.46% of the bond sample; they 
represent 63.81% of the bank debt sample. It is noteworthy that small 
firms apparently cannot raise public debt capital as easily as large 
firms.
Bank debt agreements represent larger relative agreements than 
bond debt issues. Median relative size of new financing is .4731 for
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bank debt agreements, .1602 for bond debt Issues. This is interesting 
in light of close median values for long term leverage (book value of 
long term debt / market value of equity): .4303 for bank debt firms,
.4903 for bond debt firms.
C. Event Study Results
The search for bond announcements yielded 310 observations with 
identifiable CRSP returns sufficient to estimate market model 
parameters. Event study results are presented in Table 7-2. Consistent 
with prior studies of straight bond announcements, they have an 
statistically insignificant two day average prediction error of -0.12% 
(z—-0.62) with 47.7% of the prediction errors positive. The 
uncontaminated subsample of 207 generates an APE of 0.01% (z—-0.11), 
also not statistically significant with 46.9% of the prediction errors 
positive. Thus, contamination has a slightly negative, but 
insigniileant effect on bond announcements. The contaminated sample 
(clean observations omitted) has an APE of -0.34% (-0.92), also not 
statistically signifleant.
Disaggregating the uncontaminated sample by firm size reveals 
that, like bank debt announcements, the APE is larger for small f1rms 
0.80% (z—1.13, n—44), but not statistically significant or statistically 
different from the large firm APE of -0.21% (z—-0.72, n-163). 
Furthermore, a means test Implies equality of means with a t -  1.320. 
Thus, there is no support of a firm size effect for bond announcements. 
Disaggregating by bond characteristics yields only one subsample with a 
statistically significant APE. Fifteen zero coupon bond announcements
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have an APE of -1.36% (z—-1.76), statistically significant at the .10 
level. Thirty-five issues with sinking fund provisions have an APE of 
0.78% (z—1.10). Twenty-five subordinated bond Issues generate an APE of 
-0.12% (z— 0.41), with 36% of the prediction errors positive. Twelve 
announcements are of senior bond issues generating an APE of -0.15%
(z-0.32).
Only one sample classified by purpose has a statistically 
significant APE. Four bond announcements for acquisitions produce a 
statistically negative APE of -2.58% (z— 3.12) with no positive 
prediction errors. Bond announcements with no specified purpose have an 
APE of 0.21% (z—0.60, n-45). Bond issues to repay debt (n—110) generate 
an APE of -0.03% (Z--0.40). The stated use is general purpose/working 
capital in 26 announcements generating an APE of 0.25% (z—0.89).
Two sample classifications based on firm characteristics produce 
statistically significant APEs. First, forty-one firms that had not 
paid recent dividends have an APE of 1.02% (z—1.93) with 58.5% of the 
prediction errors positive. Firms that paid recent dividends have an 
APE of -0.19% (z— 0.92, n-165) .
Second, the sample dichotimized by relative bank debt displays 
statistically significant APEs for both above and below median groups. 
Forty-three firms with below median Compustat bank debt have an APE of 
0.86% (z-1.78), statistically significant at the .10 level. Forty-four 
below median firms have an APE of -1.00% (z— 2.16), statistically 
significant. The APEs are statistically different with a t—3.08. 
Moreover, the below median sample has 67.4% positive prediction errors; 
34.1% the above median sample has positive prediction errors. Thus,
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bond Issues are positive signals for firms with relatively low bank 
debt, negative signals for firms with relatively high bank debt.
Firms employing Big-Eight auditors have an APE of 0.00% (z— 0.25, 
n—196). Ten firms that employ non-Big-Eight auditors have an APE of 
1.05% (z—1.26). The difference is not statistically significant, but 
the pattern appears consistent with an auditor quality hypothesis.
The percentage of outstanding common shares held by institutions 
could not be found for 13 firms with an APE of 1.39% (z—1.06). The 
median institutional holdings for firms in the bond sample that have 
available data is 25.83%. Firms with above median institutional 
holdings have an APE of 0,04% (z—0.65, n-97). Firms with below median 
institutional holdings have an APE of -0.22% (z— 1.20). The pattern of 
the APEs is consistent with an institutional monitoring hypothesis, but 
the means are not statistically different.
For two firms the number of institutional investors could not be 
found; they have an APE of -5.28% (z—1.79). The median number of 
institutional investors for firms with available data is 89. Firms with 
below median number of institutional investors (n—101) have an APE of 
0.17% (Z--0.08). Firms with above median number of institutional 
investor have an APE of -0.05% (z-0.17). Again the pattern is 
consistent with hypotheses but no significant difference exists.
Insider holdings could not be found in Value Line for 111 firms 
with an APE oi -0.19% (z--1.08). Median insider holdings for the other 
firms in the sample is 4.0%. Forty-seven firms with below median 
insider holdings have an APE of -0.07% (z—0.06). Above median insider 
holding firms have an APE of 0.52% (z—1.32). These results display a
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pattern opposite of bank debt announcements but have no significant 
differences. It might be argued that the relatively greater incentive 
to expropriate bondholder wealth by managers of firms with larger 
Insider holdings generates more positive announcement effects for bond 
Issues. Rational bondholders of these firms should expect this, though, 
and force equityholders to bear expected costs.
Median long-term leverage, calculated from bond sample firms with 
available data, is 0.4902 76 (book value of long-term debt/market value 
of equity). Below median leverage firms have an APE of 0.15% (z—0.83, 
n-102, 51.0% positive) while above median leverage firms have an APE of 
-0,04% (z— 0,71, n-102, 44.1% positive). Three firms with unknown 
leverage have an APE of -3,60% (z—-1.66). Again, the pattern is 
opposite from bank debt results, but no significant differences exist.
D. Regression Results
No specific hypotheses are developed about cross-sectional 
behavior of bond announcement prediction errors. Nevertheless, an 
examination is necessary to compare and contrast cross-sectional 
behavior with bank debt announcements. Results are reported In 
Table 7-3.
Equation (1) of Table 7-3 shows that bond announcement prediction 
errors are negatively, but not significantly, related to firm size. The 
coefficient of firm size is -.0015 (t— 1.09). Thus, the pattern of 
results is similar to bank debt announcements, but statistical 
significance does not obtain. Furthermore, the Intercept is not 
statistically signifleant. .0192 (t-1.11).
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Equation (2) adds variables related to the relative amount of new 
financing. A dummy equal to one If the amount Is known Is negative In 
sign, but not statistically significant. The coefficient of relative 
size Is .0013 (t-0.19), not statistically different from zero. Thus, 
unlike bank debt announces ■ ’s, bond announcement excess returns are not 
statistically related to firm size or relative size of debt Issue.
Equation (3) adds monitoring and control variables to the 
regression equation. Three coefficients obtain statistical 
significance. A dummy equal to unity for sinking fund issues is 
statistically positive at the .10 level: .0131 (t-1.81). A dummy equal
to unity for firms that paid a recent dividend Is statistically 
negative: -.0135 (t— 2.14) at the .05 level. This result combined with
event study results classified by dividend history suggests that firms 
paying dividends and raising capital externally are punished by the 
capital market with negative share price responses.
Relative existing bank debt is negatively related to bond 
announcement effects as evidenced by a coefficient of -.0532 (t--3.05), 
statistically significant at the .01 level. This result is particularly 
interesting because a similar result obtained for large firms announcing 
bank debt Issues. It could be argued that bank lending does not entail 
asset services for large firms so that bank financing for these firms Is 
similar to public financing, thus, generating similar effects. While 
the results are similar across large firm bank and bond samples, they 
are still puzzling. Bond announcement prediction errors are unrelated 
to other security and firm-specific variables.
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Equation (A) adds two variables related to Institutional holdings. 
Again, these are added separately because firm size and institutional 
holdings are correlated creating multicollinearity problems. The 
coefficient of natural log of institutional holdings is -.0041 (t—  
1.87), statistically significant at the .10 level. Thus, firms with 
larger institutional holdings experience smaller or negative returns 
upon announcement of bond issues.
The significance of coefficients of relative bank debt and sinking 
fund provisions remains. The coefficient for relative existing bank 
debt is -.0575 (t--3.36), statistically significant at the .01 level.
The coefficient of the dummy for issues with sinking fund provisions is 
.0154 (t-2.15), statistically significant at the .05 level.
The F statistic for this regression is 2.238 indicating that the 
null of all regression coefficients equal to zero can be rejected at the 
.01 level. Moreover, the adjusted R1 is ,0985.
Thus, bond announcement prediction errors display cross-sectional 
patterns different from that of bank debt announcements. This suggests 
that the capital market is able to distinguish between the two and 
regards bank debt as providing valuable assets services for small firms.
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Table 7-1: Descriptive statistics for firm and security specific
characteristics for 205 firms announcing bond issues
V a r ia b le Mean Median Minimum Maximum 01
<z
Issue amount 
(^millions) 122.17 75 5 5000 194
Issue amount/ 
mkt. value of eq. . 3077 . 1602 .0137 3 .95 193
Mkt. value of eq. 
($millions) 1268.35 445 . 54 4.29 36730.53 205
Maturity (yrs) 18. 85 20 4 50 183
Long term debt/ 
mkt. value of eq, .6878 .4903 .0075 8.41 201
Insider hlgs (%) 10.11 4 0.1 61 96
Instit. hldgs (%) 25 . 73 25.83 .0926 65. 75 194
# institutional 
investors 135.067 89 1 895 195
Relative bank 
debt 1153 .0366 .0015 1 .15 87
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Table 7-2: Two day average prediction errors for bond announcements for
various groups
CrouD %APE(Q.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
By contamination:
Full Sample 1 o 1 o <7* S3 310 47.7
Uncontaminated
announcements 0.01 -0.11 207 46 . 9
Contami nated
announcements 1 O CN&O1 103 49 . 4
By firm size:
Small firms 0.80 1.13 44 52. 3
Large firms -0.21 -0. 72 163 45.4
By security characteristics:
Sinking fund 0.78 1. 10 35 51.4
No sinking fund -0.15 -0 . 62 172 45.9
Subordinated - 0 . 12 -0.41 25 36.0
Not subordinated 0.02 0.03 182 48 .4
Senior -0. 15 0. 32 12 50.0
Not senior 0.01 -0. 20 195 46 . 7
Zero or OID -1 . 36 -1. 76 15 26.7
Coupon bond 0.11 0.37 192 48.4
By purpose:
Not stated 0.21 0.60 45 51.1
Repay debt -0.03 -0.40 110 45.5
Acquisitions -2.58“ -3 .12 4 0.0
General purpose/
Working capital 0.25 0.89 26 50.0
By firm characteristics: 
Paid recent dlvldend-0.19 









Table 7-2 (cont’d): Two day average prediction errors bond
announcements for various groups
Grouo %APE(0.+1) Z-stat N % Positive
By firm characteristics (cont'd):
Big-Eight auditor 0.00 -0.25 196 46.9
Non-Big-Eight 1.05 1.26 10 50.0
< raed. inst. hldgs -0. 22 -1.20 97 41 . 2
> med. inst. hldgs 0.04 0.65 97 49 . 5
Unknown Inst, hldgs 1. 39 1.06 13 69 .2
Big-Eight auditor 0.00 -0.25 196 46 .9
Non-Big-Eight 1.05 1. 26 10 50.0
< med. inst. hldgs -0.22 -1. 20 97 41. 2
> med, inst. hldgs 0.04 0. 65 97 49 . 5
Unknown inst. hldgs 1. 39 1.06 13 69 .2
< med. insider hldgs -0.07 0.06 4 7 55 . 3
> med. insider hldgs 0. 52 1. 32 49 49.0
Unknown insider hldgs -0.19 -1.08 111 42 . 3
< med. # inst. hldrs 0.17 -0.08 101 44.6
> med. # inst. hldrs -0.05 0.17 104 50.0
Unknown # inst, hldrs -5.28 -1. 79 2 0.0
< med. leverage 0.15 0.83 102 51.0
> med. leverage -0.04 -0.71 102 44.1
Unknown leverage -3.60 -1.66 3 0.0
< med. relative
bank debt 0.86' 1.78 43 67.4
> med. relative
bank debt i i-* o o i -2.16 44 34.1
Unknown relative
bank debt 0.07 0.09 120 44. 2
Median institutional holdings (% of total shares outstanding) 
Median insider holdings (% of total shares outstanding)
Median # of Institutional investors
Median leverage (long term debt/market value of equity)






Table 7-3: Weighted LS regressions of 205 clean bond issue announcement
two-day prediction errors on various monitoring and control variables.
Equation_______________C D_____________L2J___________LU___________(A)_____
Intercept .0192 .0271 . 0339 .0171
(1. U ) (1.08) (1.34) (0.54)
ln(firm size) -.0015 -.0012 -.0014 .0016
(-1.09) (-0.65) (-0.63) (0.63)
Relative size .0013 -.0004 .0022
(0.19) (-0.05) (0.33)




Sinking fund provision .0131 .0154*
(1.81) (2.15)
Subordinated debt . 0045 .0055
(0.63) (0.77)
Senior debt -.0160 - .0172
(-1.50) (-1.64)
Zero coupon or 0ID -.0114 - .0098
(-1-11) (-0.95)
ln(maturity) . 0012 -.0006
(0.21) (-0.10)
Maturity information -.0011 -.0006
(-0.06) (-0.04)
Big-eight auditor -.0036 -.0018
(-0.32) (-0.16)
Recent dividend -.0135* -.0096
(-2.14) (-1.49)
ln(insider holdings) .0032 .0040
(1.10) (1.38)
Insider hlgs available .0096 .0092
(1.21) (1.17)
Relative bank debt -.0532“ -.0575"
(-3.08) (-3.36)
Bank debt known .0081 .0067
(1.36) (1.13)
ln(# institutional holders) -.0041
(-1.87)
Institutional Investors available - .0127
(-1.33)
Adjusted R2 .0009 -.0035 .0729 .0985
F 1.183 0.766 2.003“ 2.238”
Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions
This thesis examines equity share price responses to announcements 
of bank credit agreements and bond Issues. Three important questions 
are addressed. First, we present a test of the delegated monitoring 
hypothesis, or asset services theory of the banking firm. The 
hypothesis is that banks specialize in private Information collection 
and processing which allows them to fulfill the role of a delegated 
monitor. Private information that either cannot be revealed to public 
capital markets or is too costly to be gathered by other market 
participants can be collected and processed efficiently by banks. 
Efficient and effective monitoring by banks reduces agency costs for 
other clalmholders thereby benefltting firm shareholders.
We argue that if wealth changes associated with announcements of 
bank debt derive from agency cost savings, then a wealth change should 
depend on how well a firm is currently monitored. Specifically, firms 
that are less well monitored are hypothesized to benef1t relatively more 
from bank monitoring as evidenced by large share price responses. The 
level of current monitoring to which a firm is subject is measured by 
variables that proxy the levels of agency cost control devices. Using 
event study and regression methodologies, we investigate whether share 
price responses to bank debt announcements are cross-sectlonally related 
to monitoring variables.
We find that average two day prediction errors associated with 
announcements of bank debt are significantly positive only for small
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firms (below CRSP median market value of equity for the year of the 
announcement). The uncontaminated sample of large firms (above CRSP 
median size), and virtually all sub-classifications, have statistically 
insignificant average prediction errors. Furthermore, prediction errors 
associated with bank debt announcements are cross sectionally related to 
the natural log of firm size for the uncontaminated sample. The 
coefficient of natural log of firm size is negative and significant at 
the .01 level. Dichotimlzing regression samples into large and small 
firms reveals that the relation obtains only for small firms.
The results suggest that bank monitoring is valuable only for 
small firms, a finding consistent with arguments by Fama (1985) and 
Diamond (1985) in the asset services banking firm literature. The 
results are also consistent with theoretical and empirical findings in 
the accounting literature focusing on the differential Information sets 
available for large and small firms. Thus, the delegated monitoring 
hypothesis is supported by the results. Bank lending entails valuable 
asset services for firms that likely have greater asymmetric information 
problems. After controlling for firm size, share price responses are 
unrelated to other monitoring variables suggesting that the measure of 
firm size captures most of the potential benefits of bank monitoring.
The second important question the thesis addresses concerns Lummer 
and McConnell’s (1989) finding of insignificant average share price 
responses to initiations of bank debt and statistically positive average 
responses to renewals. This result is anomalous if rational investors 
form unbiased expectations about future events. Thus, we investigate 
the robustness of this result to the inclusion of relatively more small
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firms (NASDAQ firms) in the sample. The delegated monitoring hypothesis 
and arguments in the accounting literature regarding firm size suggest 
that firm size may be an important determinant of the value of flrm-bank 
relationships.
We find that bank debt initiations generate significantly positive 
average two day prediction errors for small firms. This study differs 
from LM by including NASDAQ firms, typically much smaller in market 
value, so that this sample is richer in small firms. Furthermore, LM do 
not disaggregate their sample by firm size. Given the importance of 
firm size to the market response to bank debt announcements, it is 
likely that LM's sample did not contain enough small firms. The APE for 
renewals is positive and not statistically different from the APE for 
initiations, suggesting that bank debt renewals provide valuable 
periodic review and monitoring services.
The third .. portint question Is whether share price responses to 
bond announcements exhibit cross-sectional behavior similar to bank debt 
announcements. Theoretical arguments suggest that bondholders will not 
undertake monitoring activities similar to banks. We argue that 
monitoring by bond trustees is less intensive and relies on more easily 
accessible information. Consistent with existing studies, we find 
insignificant average share price responses to announcements of straight 
bonds. Furthermore, we find that bond announcement prediction errors 
are unrelated to firm size and other monitoring variables. An exception 
is a statistically negative relationship with relative existing bank 
debt. This result obtains with both event study and regression 
methodologies. Another Important result emerges from this study.
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Results suggest that the omission of announcements carried only on the 
newswire may create a selection bias. The uncontaminated sample of bank 
debt announcements carried only on the newswire generate an 
insignificant average two day prediction error. The sample of WSJ 
announcements has a statistically significant two day APE. Moreover, 
the APE of Lilt* newswire sample is statistically different from the APE 
for the WSJ sample. Even the sample of small firm newswire 
announcements has a statistically insignificant APE. The newswire 
sample is collected for the years 1984-1986. Results indicate that more 
than half of the uncontaminated announcements of bank debt initiations 
and renewals for the time period are carried by the newswire but not the 
WSJ .
This study also extends the literature by presenting a 
comprehensive event study analysis of the types of contaminating 
information that accompany Information about bank debt. Bank debt 
information is accompanied by a wide variety of other announcements. 
Results are consistent with a hypothesis that firm managers 
systematically attempt to arrange announcements of initiations and 
renewals of bank debt when negative information must be announced.
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